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The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims: Has It Mastered Chevron's Step Zero?
Linda D. Jellum'

INTRODUCTION
It has been twenty-five years since Chevron US.A. Inc. v.
NaturalResources Defense Council,Inc.,' was decided. Chevron
was originally welcomed as a revolutionary hero: a tool that the
Reagan administration could use to protect deregulation.' Chevron
transformed deference analysis into a simple, two step test. First,
a court should determine whether Congress had decided the issue,
if not, the court was obligated to defer to any reasonableagency
interpretation. 4 While Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron,
never intended Chevron to revolutionize deference jurisprudence,
Chevron did just that.' It shifted interpretive power from the courts
to the agencies.'

' Associate Professor of Law, Mercer School of Law.

The article was prepared for and
presented at the Eleventh Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) held in March 2010 in Washington, D.C. I would like to
thank the organizers of the conference, Judge Davis and Judge Hagel, and especially, Professor
Michael Allen, for inviting me to speak. I also thank Mercer University School of Law for
research and technological assistance. Finally, I would like to thank my research assistant, Troy
Clark (JD expected 2010) for his outstanding and tireless help with the research for this paper.
2 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Although many commentators insert a comma in the official cite,
there are no commas in the petitioner's name in the official U.S. Reports. Thomas W.
Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in ADMIN. LAW
STORIEs 399 n.l (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum ofDeference: Supreme
Court Treatment ofAgency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083, 1087 (2008).
Id. at 1086.
Linda Jellum, Chevron s Demise: A Survey ofChevronfivm Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN.
L. REv. 725, 738-39 (2007); GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 449 (5th ed. 2009).
According to Professor Lawson, the D.C. Circuit was responsible for the revolution. Id. at 44950. It adopted a broad reading of Chevrn, believing that the opinion substituted a simple twostep test for the more complicated multiple factor analysis previously in existence. Id
6 Jellum, supra note 5, at 742; cf Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialDeference to Executive
Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 997 (1992) (stating that Chevron "seriously weakens the
primary check on agency abuses while offering no adequate alternative in its place").
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[W]hen courts defer to agency interpretations,
power to say what the law means shifts from the
judiciary to the executive branch. Because of this
shift in power, the appropriate level of deference has
changed over time as the Justices have been more or
less comfortable with deferring to the executive.'
Apparently, viewing its concession as too big, the United
States Supreme Court (Supreme Court or "Court") has retreated
from Chevron's broad grant of power to agencies, but not by
explicitly recalling the beast. Rather the Supreme Court has
added a series of steps to Chevron's application, turning Chevron
from a simple two step into a multi-faceted flamenco.
While many thought that Chevron would simplify and
streamline an otherwise uncertain area-deference to agency
interpretations-ultimately, the Supreme Court has introduced
unwanted and unexpected complexity.' Indeed, in 2005, Professor
Lisa Bressman criticized the Supreme Court jurisprudence in this
area and coined the term "Mead's Mess."' A year later, Professor
Cass Sunstein similarly lamented the craziness of the Court's
jurisprudence and fashioned the term "Chevron Step Zero." 0
More recently, Professor William Eskridge expressed the following
complaint: "Although the complicated and unevenly applied
deference continuum is working fine for deciding cases before
the Supreme Court, [it] is not a satisfactory regime for providing
guidance to lower courts, legislators, agencies, and the citizenry.
The Court should simplify the continuum. . . ."n No doubt.
D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 209 (2008) (citation omitted).
I See generally Jack M. Beerman, End the FailedChevron Experiment Now: How
Chevron Has Failedand Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CoNN. L. REv. 779
(2010) (discussing overlapping reasons why Chevron should be overruled).
' Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled JudicialReview ofAgency Action, 58
VAND. L. REv. 1443, 1486 (2005).
"o Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 207-09 (2006) (exploring
the disagreement between Justices Scalia and Breyer regarding Chevron's first step).
" Eskridge & Baer, supranote 3, at 1091-92. The authors also stated that "the courts of appeals
are the primary venue for judicial review of agency interpretations. Given its discretionary
7 LINDA
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Hence, while Chevron initially appeared to offer an
uncomplicated and predictable framework for agency deference,
"Chevron has proved to be less clear, predictable, and simple
than originally envisioned. Its guidance is unclear; its application
has been, at best, uncertain."I 2 In just twenty-five years, the
Supreme Court has transformed Chevron's simple two step into a
complicated dance suitable only for experts. Commentators have
been quick to offer alternatives," although the suggestions seem to
have fallen on deaf ears.
Whether Chevron should have been decided as it was is
irrelevant today.'4 It is here for the long term. Hence, what is
relevant today is whether those individuals bound to follow the
Supreme Court's direction in this area can do so. This article
explores Chevron and its progeny and examines one court's
application of this complicated doctrine: the United States Court
of Appeals for Veterans Claims ("Veterans Court").' 5 To do so, in
Part I of this article, I explain briefly why agencies are entitled to
deference when they interpret statutes. In Parts II and III, I explore
jurisdiction over appeals and the Justices' disinclination to exercise that discretion, the Supreme
Court reviews only a small percentage of agency interpretations that make their way through the
fedeml court system." Id at 1096.; accordBeerman, supranote 8 (calling for an end to Chevron).
" Jellum, supra note 5, at 726.
13 See, e.g., Beerman, supra note 8, at 843-50 (proposing replacements to the basic twostep Chevron framework).
'4 Compare Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: JudicialReview ofAgency
Interpretationsof Statutory Provisions,41 VAND. L. REv. 301 (1988) (arguing that
interpretations of terms in statutes are policy decisions best left to agencies), and The
Honorable Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative InterpretationsofLaw,
1989 DuKE L.J. 511 (1989) (suggesting that Chevron is correct because of congressional
intent), with Merrill, supranote 6 (lamenting that Chevron gives agencies too much
power), and Beerman, supra note 8 (arguing that Chevron has proven to be a complete
and total failure and thus should be overruled immediately).
5 The Veterans Court was created by Congress in 1988 as an Article I Court. Veterans'
Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.). It exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the decisions
of the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on the motion of claimants. Id; see generally
Michael P: Allen, Significant Developments in Veterans Law (2004-2006)and What
They Reveal about the U.S. Court ofAppeals for Veterans Claims and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the FederalCircuit,40 MICH. J.L. REFORm 483 (2007) (discussing the history
of the Veterans Court by describing its significant decisions from 2004 to 2006).
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the Court's jurisprudence in this area to explain Chevron's Step
Zero: including the law pre-Chevron, the law of Chevron, and the
law post-Chevron-the development of Chevron's complicated
Step Zero. Simply put, Chevron applies when Congress intends
that an agency be given deference for interpretations, regardless
of how the agency reached the interpretation.' 6 In these situations,
Chevron is appropriate because Congress intended for the agencies,
not the courts, to develop this area of law. In contrast, when
Congress does not so intend, then the agency is deserving of only
Skidmore" deference at best. In this situation, Congress intended
the courts to be the final arbiters of these types of legal issues."
After explaining and identifying an approach to this complicated
area of law, in Part IV, I examine recent jurisprudence from the
Veterans Court to see if it is accurately applying Chevron's Step
Zero. Not surprisingly given the poor guidance from the Supreme
Court, the Veterans Court struggles with this area of jurisprudence.
Additionally, within this part, I briefly explore an issue unique to
veterans' law, the Gardner" presumption-which provides that
interpretive doubt should be resolved in the veteran's favor2 o-and
suggest that this presumption conflicts with Chevron.

"

See infra Part III.

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
WILLIAM F. FUNK, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
AND PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND CASES 401 (3d ed. 2006) (stating that "the Court is using
hypothetical intent, focusing on whether it is reasonable to assume that Congress
meant for the courts to defer to the agency's interpretation or application of a statutory
provision"). In determining whether Congress has intent, the United States Supreme
Court (Supreme Court or "Court") does not review legislative history for actual intent,
rather it looks for "hypothetical intent," based on the factors identified above. See id.
' See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994).
zo See infra Part IV.
17
I
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I. THE BASIS FOR DEFERENCE
Article 11 of the Constitution grants the judiciary all "judicial
Power."" According to Marburyv. Madison," this language means that
"[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is."" But the judiciary is not the only branch of
government that must interpret statutes; administrative agencies, which
are part of the executive branch, must also interpret the statutes they
administer and implement." A formalist constitutional scholar might
suggest that agencies should have no interpretive role or at least not one
that trumps the judicial role." Yet, this view is extreme.
For many reasons, agency interpretation is necessary and
judicial deference is appropriate. The modem administrative
state is vastly complex. Agencies have expertise in their area of
responsibility; consider the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA),
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), or the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). Each of these agencies have experts
and specialists trained in the relevant field. Judges, who are
generalists, are experts in the law, not in the environment or food
safety. Hence, it simply makes more sense for personnel within
the VA to determine disability benefits for veterans, for scientists
within the EPA to determine acceptable levels of pollutants in
the air, and for nutritionists within the FDA to determine the
composition of public school lunches.
Moreover, agencies may be more responsive to the
electorate than the judiciary would be. National goals and policies
change as society evolves. Because administrators are accountable

2

§1
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

2

Id. at 177.

2

U.S. CONST. art. III,

supra note 7, at 207-08.
See Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent,and the Rise of the Administrative
State: Toward a ConstitutionalTheory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 11 (1994)
(arguing that "[u]nder a pure formalist approach, most, if not all, of the administrative
state is unconstitutional").
24

JELLUM,

2s
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to the public, while judges are not, administrators will be more
likely to adapt policy to match populist expectations. 16 Judges, who
are elected for life," are more insulated from political backlash.
Thus, agencies should receive some deference when they interpret
statutes within their area of expertise. Even Marbury's author,
Chief Justice John Marshall, suggested that courts should respect an
agency's "uniform construction" of "doubtful" statutes."
Today, there is no question that agencies have the power
to enact rules with the force and effect of law, so long as Congress
provides an "intelligible principle" for the agency to follow when
it does so. 30 The issue here is what level of deference judges should
give to an agency when, in the process of developing such a rule, the
agency interprets a statute. As the Supreme Court has addressed
this issue over the last seventy years, it has oscillated among three
options: (1) complete deference, (2) limited deference, or (3) no
deference. Rather than settle on just one standard, the Supreme
Court has opted to vary deference based on the circumstances
of the interpretation. To see what I mean, we need to review the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area from 1941 to today.
II. CHEVRON'S CREATION
A. The Law Pre-Chevron
In the civil context, appellate courts decide question of
law de novo. After all, appellate judges are experts in this area.
This same standard does not apply in the administrative context.
Cf Bressman, supra note 9, at 1449 (reasoning that "by placing the interpretive role
in administrative rather than judicial hands, it allows agency interpretations to evolve as
presidential administrations and executive priorities change").
2 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
2 See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations,
Agency Expertise, andthe MisplacedLegacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 735, 741
(2002) ("Skidmore, Chenery, and Cement Institute all invoke[d] enhanced agency expertise
as the rationale for affording agency work product deference on judicial review.").
29 United States v. Vowell, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 368, 372 (1810).
3o J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409-11 (1928).
26
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Instead, agencies have long received deference for their legal
determinations. Yet the precise parameters of this deference have
been the subject of much debate among academics, judges, and
even the Justices of the Supreme Court. Indeed, this area of law is
still unsettled, despite years of analysis. To understand the law as
it exists today, it is helpful to understand its evolution.
In the 1940s and 1950s, the Supreme Court decided three
cases that addressed this issue. First, in 1941, the Court decided
Gray v. Powell." In that case, the Court resolved two issues:
(1) whether coal that was transferred from one entity to another
without any transfer of title has been "sold or otherwise disposed
of' within the meaning of the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937; and
(2) whether the regulated entity qualified for a tax exemption as
a "producer" of coal. While both issues involved questions of
law-specifically, the meaning of statutory language-the first
issue was a pure question of law, while the second issue was a
question of the application of the law to the facts of the case.
The Court applied two different deference standards to resolve
the two issues. For the pure question of law issue, the Court
applied a de novo standard and independently determined what
the language of the statute meant; the Court did not defer to the
agency's interpretation of the statutory language.3 4 But as to the
second issue, the Court deferred to the agency's interpretation
and application of the statute to the facts before it. 35 The precise
amount of deference was not clearly defined, 6 but the Court stated
that deference was appropriate because "Congress . .. found it

more efficient to delegate [this issue] to those whose experience in
a particular field gave promise of a better informed, more equitable
[resolution of the issues]."3
LAWSON, supra note 5, at 411.

314 U.S. 402 (1941).
3 Id. at 411, 415.
Id. at 415.
2

3 Id. at 412.
36 Id. (saying

"this delegation will be respected and the administrative conclusion left untouched").

31 Id. at 411-12.
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Similarly, in 1944, in NationalLaborRelations Boardv.
HearstPublications,Inc.," the Court decided whether to defer to
the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) interpretation of the
Wagner Act. Again, the Court addressed two issues: (1) whether the
term "employee" in the Act included common law understandings
of that term; and (2) whether the term "employee," if it were not
limited by common law understandings, applied to the newsboys in
the case." And like Gray, the first issue involved a pure question
of law, while the second involved a question of the application of
law to the facts of the case. The Court applied the same deference
standards as it had in Gray: The Court approached the pure question
of law de novo,40 while it approached the question involving the
application of law to fact with deference to the NLRB. 4' Because
the NLRB would have "familiarity with the circumstances and
backgrounds of employment relationships in various industries," the
Court held that the NLRB's application of the law to the facts of the
case was entitled to deference. 42 According to the Court, so long as an
agency's interpretation had "'warrant in the record' and a reasonable
basis in law" a court should not substitute its own interpretation for
that of the agency entrusted with administering the statute.43 Thus, the
Court relied on agency expertise and express congressional delegation
to support its decision to defer." According to these two cases then,
courts should defer to agency interpretations involving questions of
law application when the agency's interpretation is reasonable.
Again, in 1951, the Court confirmed this two-tracked
deference approach in O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon,Inc."
322 U.S. Ill (1944), overruled in part by Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503
U.S. 318 (1992).
3 Id. at 120.
o Id. at 124-29.
41 Id. at 130.
38

42

Id.

4

Id. at 131.

" Id. at 130.
4s 340 U.S. 504

(1951). In this case, an employee of Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc. drowned
during non-work hours when he attempted to rescue two men trapped on a reef. Id. at 505.
The employer maintained the recreation area for its employees. Id. The employee's mother
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There were two issues in the case, one involving a pure question
of law-specifically, what did the term "course of employment"
mean in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act-and the other involving a question of the application of that
law to the facts of the case-specifically, if the term was broader
than the common law understanding of the term, did the statute
apply to the acts at issue." The Court talked about the second
issue as a question of fact,4 7 but the Court was simply wrong
in its characterization; the issue of whether the term "course of
employment" includes common law understanding of that term is
a pure question of law. To resolve the issue, the Court applied a de
novo standard of review.4 8 And the Court suggested that the second
issue-the issue involving the application of law to fact-required
a deference standard similar to the Administrative Procedure Act's
substantial evidence standard, 4 9 a standard relatively close to the
reasonableness standard articulated in Hearst.so
Together, these three cases offered a coherent, two-tracked
approach to the issue of judicial review of agency interpretations:
When the issue is one of pure interpretation, the
courts are at least as well situated as are the agencies
to determine the correct meaning of statutory terms,
so agencies get no deference. When, however,
the issue is one of law application, and one must
determine whether an ambiguous statute should be
extended to cover a specific fact pattern, then the
twin considerations of agency expertise and probable
filed for compensation, claiming the drowning arose out of the course of his employment.
Id. at 505-06. The agency granted the petition; the district court denied the employer's
petition to set aside the award; and the Ninth Circuit reversed. Id. at 506.
46 Id. at 506-07.
11Id. at 507.
48 Id. at 508.
Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006) (noting that a reviewing court shall hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be, among other things,
not supported by substantial evidence).
so See Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944).
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congressional intent justify giving agency decisions a
level of deference comparable to the level afforded to
agency factfinding.s'
Yet, this summary is misleading.52 In the middle of
deciding these three cases, the Court added a wrinkle to its
developing two-track approach with Skidmore v. Swift & Co."
Skidmore was decided after Hearstbut before 0Leary. At issue
in the case was whether employees of Swift & Co. were entitled
to overtime pay for on-call time under the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 (FLSA).54 Again, resolution of the case involved two
issues: first, whether the FLSA specifically precluded on-call time
from being included as working time; and second, assuming the
FLSA did not, whether the Swift & Co. employees' on-call time
s' LAWSON, supra note 5, at 433.

The above analysis of this trilogy suggests that the Court employed a simple, clear,
and consistent approach. While the Court was deciding these three cases, it was
simultaneously deciding other cases in which it did not use its simple two-tracked
approach. For example, in 1947, the Court decided PackardMotor CarCo. v. National
LaborRelations Board,330 U.S. 485 (1947). The issue in that case was whether
the term "employees" in the Wagner Act covered foremen with specific, supervisory
responsibilities. Id. at 486. Much like the second issue in Hearst, this issue really
involved the application of law to the specific facts of the case. LAwSON, supra note 5, at
436. Yet, the Court did not defer to the Board's interpretation in this case, as the Court
had in Hearst.
It is unclear why the Court took a different approach. Some commentators have
suggested that the issue in Packardwas much more important than the issue in Hearst
because the entire nation would be affected by the Court's determination of whether
foreman could be members of a union. See LAWSON, supranote 5, at 436 & n.16 ("'[I]n
Hearst the Justices .. . did not regard the classification as raising a significantlegal issue. In
Packardthey did."' (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Louis B. JAFFE, JuDICIAL
5

CONmOL OF ADMINIsTRATIvE ACION 561 (1965)). Hence, because of the "importantness" of

the issue, a little deference was warranted. Id. at 436-37. Other commentators suggest that
the pro-labor reputation of the agency and its acknowledgement that it had applied the statute
inconsistently played a strong role in lowering the deference afforded by the Court. Id. at 437.
Perhaps, though, the Court's decision to apply a different standard was less calculated and
more inadvertent. Possibly, because the Court mischaracterized the issue as a "naked question
of law," it then applied the applicable (de novo), albeit wrong, standard for questions of law.
Packard,330 U.S. at 493. Or maybe the Court was simply unaware that it had, vis-i-vis the
Grey/Hearst/O'Learytrilogy, crafted this two-tracked approach. It is simply unknown.
s3 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
4 Id. at 135.

76

CHE VRON'S STEP ZERO

should be compensated.55 The first issue involved a question of
law, while the second involved a question of the application of
that law to the facts of the case. Like it had in the Gray trilogy,
the Court resolved the first issue, the pure question of law, without
deferring to the Department of Labor (DOL) at all and resolved
the second issue, the question of law application, by directing the
lower courts to defer." Yet the Court added a wrinkle: the Court
used a less deferential standard for the question of law application
than it had in the other three cases. Why?
One possible answer is that the facts in Skidmore differed
from the facts in Gray, Hearst,and O'Leary in two important ways:
first, Gray, Hearst, and O'Leary had all involved statutes that the
relevant agency was charged with administering. This fact was
not true for Skidmore: the DOL did not have delegated power to
administer the FLSA. 7 Rather, Congress expressly gave that power
to the judiciary; however, the agency did have a role under the
FLSA, which included the power to seek injunctions." The Court
could have refused to defer to the DOL at all because Congress had
not delegated to the DOL the power to administer and thus interpret
the FLSA. But the Court did not take that approach; even though
the DOL did not administer the FLSA, the Court found that some
deference was appropriate." According to the Court, deference was
appropriate because agencies have expertise in their field and are
aware of the industry customs. 60 That expertise could help inform a
court's decision. You will remember that this rationale was also used
in Gray, Hearst,and O'Leary. Thus, administering a statute was
apparently not a prerequisite to deference according to Skidmore.
ss Id. at 136-37.
56 Id. at 137-38.
5
Id. at 139-40.
58 Id. at 137.
5 Id. at 137-40.
at 137-38. The Supreme Court directed the lower court to consider the agency's
6Id.
interpretation because the agency had "accumulated a considerable experience in the
problems of ascertaining working time in employments involving periods of inactivity
and a knowledge of the customs prevailing in reference to their solution." Id.
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A second possible answer to the question of why the Court
applied a lower deference level in Skidmore is that Gray, Hearst,
and O'Leary all involved agency actions that were expected to
have the "force of law" and were enacted through procedurally
prescribed procedures.6 In contrast, in Skidmore, the DOL did
not act in a way designed to have "force of law"; rather, it issued
its interpretation via non-legislative rulemaking. Specifically,
the DOL drafted an interpretive bulletin that set forth its views
regarding the application of the FLSA in various situations.
While the bulletin did not specifically address facts identical to the
Swift & Co. employees' situation, the DOL filed an amicus brief,
arguing that the bulletin generally resolved the issue.63 The lower
court ignored the DOL's bulletin and brief entirely.64
The Supreme Court had to decide whether the
interpretations in the bulletin should receive any deference from
courts.s Again, the Court could have refused to defer to the DOL
at all simply because the process used was less deliberative and
thus likely to be less informed than the processes used in the other
cases. Yet, the Court did not take that approach. As the Court
stated in Skidmore, "The fact that the [agency's] policies and
standards are not reached by trial in adversary form does not mean
that they are not entitled to respect." 6 Instead, the Court held that
some form of deference was appropriate and remanded so that the
lower court could consider the interpretation.
While the Court had suggested in Hearst that courts should
defer to reasonable agency interpretations that "ha[ve] 'warrant in
the record,' "68 the Court specifically indicated that interpretations
" See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
62 Id. at 586-87.
63 Id. at 582-83.
" See id. at 587.
65 Id.
" Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
67 Id.
68 Nat'1 Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
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like those in Skidmore were "not controlling."69 Rather, courts
should consider whether the interpretations were persuasive, taking
into account "all those factors which give [the agency interpretation]
power to persuade, if lacking power to control."'o This "power to
persuade" test, known as Skidmore deference, was to be determined
by three factors: (1) the consistency of the agency's interpretation;
(2) the thoroughness of the agency's consideration; and (3) the
soundness of the agency's reasoning." In other words, the more
thoroughly considered and reasoned an agency interpretation was,
the more a court should defer to that interpretation:
[Skidmore deference] offered agencies some
deference, but the ... amount of deference would
vary depending on the circumstances surrounding
the agency's interpretation in each case. In effect,
agencies faced a balancing test: The more consistent,
thorough, and considered their interpretations
were, the more likely a court would defer. Agency
interpretations that were persuasive received
deference; those that were not persuasive received
little to no deference. Under Skidmore, deference
was earned, not automatic.
When the Court decided Skidmore, only Gray and Hearst
had been decided; O'Leary was not yet on the docket.73 So perhaps
the Court simply did not recognize that it was in the process of
developing a two-track approach and that, with Skidmore, it was
altering one of those tracks. Alternatively, the differences in the
delegation and interpretive procedures of the relevant agency in
Skidmore, Gray, Hearst,and O'Leary may have played a role in
the Court's choice to alter the level of deference, even though the
U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.

6 Christensen, 529
70

7 Id.
72 JELLUM, supra note 7, at 214.

Skidmore and Hearst were both decided in 1944. Hearst was decided in April, while
Skidmore was decided in December.
7
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opinion was not clear that the approach was being altered. In any
event, one of these differences, whether the agency uses "force of
law" procedures, has come to matter greatly in the post-Chevron era.
B. Chevron
The standards developed in Gray, Hearst, O'Leary, and
Skidmore remained untouched for forty years. Then, in 1984, with
the landmark case of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources
Defense Council,Inc.,7 4 the Gray-Hearst-O'Learydeference two-track
disappeared completely, and Skidmore deference disappeared for a
time." In Chevron, the Court flipped the existing deference standard
in which courts were the final arbiters of what an ambiguous statute
meant while agencies offered little more than expertise.
Chevron involved a question about the Clean Air Act.
The provision at issue required permits when a plant wished to
modify or build a "stationary source" of pollution. 6 "Stationary
source" was not defined in the act. 7 Thus, the EPA, the agency
in charge of administering the Clean Air Act, had to interpret the
term. It issued two notice and comment rulemakings interpreting
"stationary source."7 The first regulation defined "stationary
source" as the construction or installation of any new or modified
equipment that emitted air pollutants.79 But the following year, the
EPA repealed that regulation and issued a new one that expanded
the definition to encompass a plant-wide or bubble concept
467 U.S. 837 (1984). Although many commentators insert a comma in the official
cite, there are no commas in the petitioner's name in the official U.S Reports. Merrill,
supra note 2, at 399 n.1.
7 Hearst was cited in Chevron. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. It is still cited by the
Supreme Court today. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1171 (2009) ("We
accordingly acknowledged that a complete interpretation of a statutory provision might
demand both judicial construction and administrative explication." (citing Nat'l Labor
Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. Ill (1944)).
76 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
77 Id. at 841.
78 Id. at 840, 858-59.
7 Id. at 840 n.2.
74
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definition.8 o The bubble concept interpretation allowed a plant to
offset increased air pollutant emissions at one part of its plant so
long as it reduced emissions at another part of the plant. Under the
new interpretation, as long as total emissions at the plant remained
constant, no permit was required.8 The environmentalists sued.
The issue for the Supreme Court was whether the EPA's
interpretation of "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act was
valid.I The Supreme Court upheld the agency's interpretation.
In doing so, the Court ignored the Gray-Hearst-O'Learydeference
two-track and Skidmore's "power-to-persuade" test and instead
created a new, two-step deference framework. Under the first step,
a court should determine "whether Congress ha[d] directly spoken
to the precise question at issue."" When applying this first step,
courts should not defer to agencies at all. Rather, "[t]he judiciary is
the final authority on issues of statutory construction."" Assuming
Congress's intent is unclear, then, under step two, a court must
accept any "permissible" or "reasonable" agency interpretation,
even if the court believes a different policy choice would be
better. 6 The Court ignored its earlier distinction between pure
questions of law and questions of application of law to fact without
explanation. In addition, the Court ignored Skidmore entirely.
Instead, the Court created an entirely new deference standard, one
much more deferential to agencies.
so Id. at 858.
* Id. at 852-53.
8 Id. at 840.
3 Id. at 845, 866.
" Id. at 842. In other words, is Congress's intent clear-however clarity may be
discerned-or is there a gap or ambiguity to be resolved? According to the Court, clarity
was to be determined by "employing traditional tools of statutory construction." Id. at 843 n.9.
85

Id. at 843 n.9.

Id. at 843-44. Deference to the agency under Chevron's second step is much higher.
Indeed, if a litigant challenges an agency interpretation and loses at step one-meaning
the court finds ambiguity- that litigant will likely lose the case. According to one
empirical study of decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals in 1995 and 1996,
agencies prevail at step one 42% of the time and at step two 89% of the time. Orin S.
Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An EmpiricalStudy of the Chevron Doctrine in the
U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1,31 (1998).
86
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The Court justified this increased level of deference to
agencies for three reasons. First, the Court continued Skidmore's
deference rationale that agency personnel are experts in their field;
judges are not.87 Congress entrusts agencies to implement law in
a particular area because of this expertise. As mentioned earlier,"
scientists and analysts working for the FDA are more knowledgeable
about food safety and drug effectiveness than are judges. Because
agencies are specialists in their field, they are in a better position to
implement effective public policy. Judges are more limited in both
their knowledge of complex topics and their method of gathering
such information. While agencies can develop policy using a wide
array of methods, courts are limited to the adversarial process.
Hence, deferring to the experts makes sense.
Second, Congress simply cannot legislate every detail
in a comprehensive regulatory scheme.89 Gaps and ambiguities
are inevitable; when Congress delegates, an agency must fill and
resolve these gaps and ambiguities. In Chevron, the Supreme
Court presumed that by leaving gaps and ambiguities, Congress
impliedly delegated to the agency the authority to resolve them. 0
Third, and finally, administrative officials, unlike federal
judges, have a political constituency to which they are accountable. 9'
"[F]ederal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to
respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do."92 Thus,
in creating its two-step deference framework, the Supreme Court
identified three reasons for its decision: agency expertise, implied
congressional delegation, and democratic theory. Deference, which
had been earned by agencies through reasoned decision-making
under Skidmore and the Gray-Hearst-O'Learytrilogy, became
essentially an all-or-nothing grant of power from Congress
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
* See supra Part 1.
8 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
9o Id. at 843-44.
8

91 Id. at 865-66.
92 Id. at 866.
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under Chevron. Either Congress was clear when it drafted the
statute, and the judiciary should not defer to the agency at all, or
Congress was ambiguous or silent, and the judiciary should defer
completely so long as the agency's interpretation was reasonable.
In a Chevron-only world, deference is "an all-or-nothing grant
of power from Congress .. . either the court adopt[s] or reject[s]
the agency's reasonable interpretation in full."" But ours is not a
Chevron-only world.9 4
III. THE LAW POST-CHEVRON:

CHEVRON STEP ZERO

Ours is not a Chevron-only world because of Chevron
Step Zero. Not all agency interpretations are entitled to Chevron
deference. Rather, before a court can apply Chevron, the court
must make sure that the interpretation is one deserving of Chevron.
This step has become known as "Chevron Step Zero." There are a
number of questions to ask at this stage: (1) What did the agency
interpret? (2) Which agency interpreted the statute? (3) How did
the agency interpret the statute? And (4) Can this agency interpret
the statute? Below, I explore each question in more detail.
A. What Did the Agency Interpret?
Chevron deference is an option only when an agency
interprets the appropriate kind of legal text. Illustratively, Chevron
does not apply when agencies interpret the Federal Constitution,"
court opinions,96 and legal instruments.97

93 Jellum, supra note 5, at 739.
9 See Eskridge & Baer,supra note 3, at 1097-98 (noting that many doctrinal questions

exist because of the Supreme Court's post-Chevron administrative law decisions).
" See LAWSON, supra note 5, at 460 (citing Gulf Power Co. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n,
208 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nat'l Cable &
Telecomm. Ass'n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002)).
9 See id. (citing Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch.
Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 n.5 (2000)).
" See id (suggesting that Chevron should not apply when interpreting legal instruments,
but noting that sometimes courts do apply it).
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Similarly, Chevron does not apply when agencies interpret
regulations. While judicial deference to agency interpretations
of statutes has varied widely through time, judicial deference to an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations has remained more
constant. Traditionally, courts defer almost completely to an agency's
interpretation of its own regulation. This high level of deference
should come as no surprise; after all, it was the agency that drafted the
regulation in the first place. Thus, in 1945, the Supreme Court held
that an agency's interpretation of its regulation has "controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.""
The Supreme Court reasoned that when Congress delegates the
authority to promulgate regulations, it also delegates authority to
interpret those regulations." Such power is a necessary corollary to
the former. This substantial level of deference is generally known as
either Seminole Rock or Auer deference. The latter term refers to the
Supreme Court case of Auer v. Robbins, 00 which followed Chevron
and confirmed that Seminole Rock deference had survived Chevron."o'
" Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
9 Id.

519 U.S. 452 (1997).
Id.at 461-63. There is at least one limit on when an agency will receive this high level of
deference. When an agency does little more than parrot the statutory language in its regulation,
then claims that it is interpreting the regulation and not the statute, the agency will not receive
Seminole Rock deference because the agency is interpreting Congress's language, not its own.
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006). Because Seminole Rock would not apply,
either Chevron or Skidmnore would apply instead. For example, in Gonzales, the Supreme
Court refused to defer to the Attorney General's decision that physician assisted suicide was
not a legitimate medical purpose for prescribing medication, and thus if a physician prescribed
medication for this reason, the physician violated the federal Controlled Substances Act. Id.
at 257-69. The Attorney General issued an interpretative rule stating that "'assisting suicide
[was] not a 'legitimate medical purpose' within the meaning of [the regulation]."' Id. at 254
(quoting 66 Fed. Reg. 56607, 56608 (Nov. 9, 2001)). An Attorney General regulation stated
that prescriptions be issued "'for a legitimate medical purpose."' Id. at 256 (quoting 21 C.F.R.
§ 1306.04 (2005)). Thus, the United States Government argued that the interpretive rule
was entitled to Auer deference because the Attorney General was simply interpreting its own
regulation. Id. The Court rejected that argument. See id In doing so, the Supreme Court stated
that Auer deference is appropriate when agencies interpret regulations bringing "specificity" to
the statutes they are enforcing. See id.at 256-57. When the agency interprets a regulation that
simply repeats or paraphrases the statutory text, the interpretation does not warrant Seminole
Rock deference because the agency is interpreting Congress's language, not its own. See id.
at 257. Additionally, the Supreme Court refused to give Chevron deference to the interpretive
100
101
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Thus, Chevron applies only when an agency interprets
a statute, not when an agency interprets any other form of legal
language.
B. Which Agency Interpreted the Statute?
But it is not enough that an agency interpret the correct type
of legal text; Chevron applies only when an agency "administers"
that legal text or statute. Agencies often interpret and apply
statutes, including statutes that the agency does not administer.
While the Court has never clearly articled what it means to
"administer" a statute, the lower court cases that have addressed
this issue suggest that agencies administer a statute when they have
a special and unique responsibility for that statute. 0 2 When more
than one agency administers a statute, Chevron is inappropriate.o 3
So, for example, although multiple agencies must interpret the
Internal Revenue Code, only the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
actually administers that Code.10 4 Thus, only the IRS should
receive Chevron deference for its interpretations of that Code.
In some cases, no agency is entitled to Chevron deference even
when the agency interprets a statute. Many agencies must interpret
and apply generally applicable statutes, such as the Administrative

rule because it was not promulgated pursuant to authority Congress delegated to the Attorney
Generi. Id.at 258-65. Ultimately, the Court applied Skidmore and found the agency's
interpretation entirely unpersuasive. Id. at 269.
102 See, e.g., Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 925-26 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Environmental Protection Agency did not administer the
reimbursement provisions of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986).
.03See Rapaport v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 59 F.3d 212, 216-17 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(declining to apply Chevron where the agency shared responsibility for the administration
of the statute with another agency); Ill. Nat'l Guard v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 854
F.2d 1396, 1400 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (declining to apply Chevron deference); cf CF Indus.,
Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 925 F.2d 476, 478 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating
in a footnote that there "might well be a compelling case to afford deference if it were
necessary for decision (where] both agencies agree as to which of them has exclusive
jurisdiction").
"' See LAWSON, supra note 5, at 461.
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Procedure Act, 0 the Regulatory Flexibility Act,o 6 the Freedom
0 and others. When an agency interprets a
of Information Act,o'
generally applicable statute, Chevron is not appropriate.'0 o
C. How Did the Agency Interpret the Statute?
Agencies interpret statutes regularly and in varied ways,
with more or less procedural formality and deliberation. For
example, an agency might interpret a statute as part of a notice
and comment rulemaking process, like the EPA did in Chevron.o9
Similarly, an agency might interpret a statute during a formal
adjudication. Or, an agency might interpret a statute when
drafting an internal policy manual or writing a letter to a regulated
entity-a non-legislative rulemaking."10 With the former processes
(adjudication and notice and comment, or legislative, rulemaking),
Congress has given the agency the authority to issue interpretations
that carry the "force of law," and the agency has used that authority
to issue the particular interpretation."' For this reason, these
processes are considered more formal, or procedurally prescribed,
while the latter processes are thought to be less formal, or less
procedurally prescribed."'
Pub. L. No. 79-404,60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (2006).
.o.Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C.).
.e.See, e.g., Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 913 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (interpreting the Federal Advisory Committee Act); Fed. Labor Relations Auth. v.
U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (refusing to apply Chevron to the
Federal Labor Relation Authority's (FLRA) interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) or the Privacy Act because "FLRA is not charged with a special duty to interpret [these
statutes]"); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 816 F.2d 730,
734 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that no deference would be given to agency's interpretation of the
FOIA because "it applies to all government agencies, and thus no one executive branch entity is
entrusted with its primary interpretation"), rev'd on othergrounds,489 U.S. 749 (1989).
"o' Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 855 (1984).
no See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 580-81, 586-89 (2000) (interpreting
a statute in response to a letter inquiry from the county); see also United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221-27 (2001) (interpreting a tariff classification ruling).
10s
106

" Mead, 533 U.S. at 231-32.
112

See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 9, at 1447 (questioning "whether Chevron deference
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In Chevron, the Court did not indicate, expressly or
implicitly, whether the deliberateness of the agency's procedures
affected the applicability of the two step analysis."' Before Chevron
was decided, however, the deliberative nature of the agency's
interpretive process was factored into the Court's analysis. Pursuant
to Skidmore deference, interpretations that were made through a more
deliberative process, such as notice and comment rulemaking, were
considered more persuasive than interpretations made through a less
deliberative process, such as interpretations in policy manuals." 4 But
in Chevron, the Court did not distinguish between deliberative agency
decisionmaking and non-deliberative agency decisionmaking." 5
Indeed, shortly after Chevron was decided, the Court applied its
two-step analysis to all types of agency interpretations, regardless
of the deliberative nature of the procedure involved."' But,
ultimately, the importance of the procedure gained currency.
Beginning in 2000, the Supreme Court decided a trilogy
of cases that limited Chevron's application based on how the
agency interpreted the statute. In Christensen v. HarrisCounty,"'
United States v. Mead Corp.,"' and Barnhartv. Walton," the
Court substantially checked Chevron's applicability based, in part,
upon the formality of the procedure the agency used to reach the
interpretation being challenged.
applies to interpretations issued through informal procedures").
"I Jellum, supra note 5, at 774.
"4 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see Sunstein, supra note 10, at 211
(explaining the difference between the Chevron and Skidmore doctrines).
"s See Jellum, supra note 5, at 774-75.
116 Id. (citing Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995)) (suggesting that Chevron should
apply to an agency's internal guideline); see also Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston
& Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417 (1992) (applying Chevron's framework to an agency's
interpretation made informally); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476
U.S. 426, 439 (1986) (suggesting that Chevron should apply to an agency's longstanding
"practice and belief'); cf Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522
U.S. 479, 499-03 (1998) (applying Chevron to an agency's approval of a credit union's
charter).
117 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
118533 U.S. 218 (2001).
Il9

535 U.S. 212 (2002).
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Christensenwas decided first. At issue in Christensen was
whether the United States Department of Labor's Wage and Hour
Division (the Division) should receive Chevron deference for an
interpretation the agency expressed in an opinion letter. 20 The
defendant in the case, Harris County, had been concerned about
the fiscal consequences of having to pay its employees for accrued
but unused compensatory time."' For this reason, the County
wrote to the Division and asked whether the County could require
its employees to take, rather than continue to accrue, their unused
compensatory time.' 2 Responding by letter, the Division told
the County that absent an employment agreement to the contrary,
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) prohibited an
employer from requiring employees to use accrued compensatory
time.' The County ignored the letter and forbade its employees
from accumulating more compensatory time than it deemed
reasonable.' 24 The employees sued, arguing that the County's
policy violated FLSA. 125
The issue for the Supreme Court was whether the agency's
interpretation of FLSA, which was contained in an informal
opinion letter, was entitled to Chevron deference.12 6 For the first
time since Chevron had been decided, the Court directly addressed
whether the agency process mattered in the deference analysis;
in other words, did a different deference standard apply when an
agency acted with less deliberation and process. 27 The Court had
not addressed this issue in Skidmore.12 s

120Christensen,529 U.S. at 586-87.
"2 Id. at 578.
122
113
124
125
126

'

Id. at 580.
Id. at 581.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 586-87.
Id. at 587.

us Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136-40 (1944). Prior to Chevron, the Court
held in Skidmore that a non-legislative rule was entitled to deference to the extent that the
interpretation was persuasive. Id. at 140; see also supra Part II.
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A majority of the justices found that the level of process
The majority reasoned that the agency's
was determinative.'
opinion letter was not entitled to Chevron deference because it
lacked the "force of law."' Agency interpretations have the
"force of law" when "Congress has delegated legislative power
to the agency and .. . the agency .. . exercise[d] that power in
promulgating the rule."' In other words:
An interpretation will have the force of law when
the agency has exercised delegated power, as to both
subject matter and format, reflecting congressional
intent that such an interpretation is to bind. "Force
of law". . . merely connotes the binding effect given
the kinds of agency interpretations that Congress
through its delegations intends to bind the courts.
And that binding effect (force of law) means simply
that the courts may not subject the interpretations
to independent judicial review, but rather must
accept them subject only to limited review for
reasonableness and consistency with the statute. Thus,
an interpretation carrying the force of law gets only
limited review because by definition it is covered by
delegation that contemplates only limited review. 2
According to Christensen, procedurally prescribed actions,
such as formal adjudication and notice and comment rulemaking,
have the "force of law". 33 Less procedurally prescribed actions,
such as "opinion letters . .. policy statements, agency manuals,
and enforcement guidelines . .. lack the force of law."' 34 The
' Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
Id.
u3 Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(defining "force of law").
132 Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency InterpretationsShould Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 39 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
133 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
1
Id.
130
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Court explained that "interpretations contained in [informal] formats
such as opinion letters are 'entitled to respect' under our decision
in Skidmore, but only to the extent that those interpretations have
the 'power to persuade."" 3 s Thus Christensenseemingly divided
agency interpretations into two, well-defined categories: those
subject to Chevron analysis-the "force of law" category-and those
subject to Skidmore analysis-the non-"force of law" category.'3 6
Christensenappeared to present a simple, albeit, formalistic
test: If the agency acted deliberately, using a process that solicited
input from a variety of sources, was binding, and was well
considered, then the agency's interpretation would be entitled
to great deference.' 3 7 If the agency acted less deliberately, more
quickly, and with less public involvement, then less deference was

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. Justice Scalia filed a separate opinion that concurred only in part with the Court's
decision and argued that Chevron had replaced Skidmore. Id. at 589-91 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia rejected the majority's
"force of law" dichotomy, arguing instead that deference should be bestowed whenever
an agency's interpretation was "authoritative" and reasonable; process was irrelevant.
Id. at 589-90. Had Justice Scalia's view prevailed, deference would have been all or
nothing as it was under Chevron: Either a court would defer to an agency interpretation
or a court would not. Degrees of deference would not have existed. See id. But the
majority disagreed with Justice Scalia's black-and-white approach, recognizing, perhaps,
that different deference standards would save courts from the stark choice between
Chevron deference and no deference at all. JELLUM, supra note 7, at 219.
Justice Breyer dissented in Christensenand wrote separately to point out that in his view
Chevron and Skidmore did not provide different standards. Christensen,529 U.S. at 59697 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Rather, these cases articulated different reasons for affording
deference to agency interpretations: Skidmore directed courts to pay particular attention to
an agency's interpretation of a statute when the agency had 'specialized experience,"' even
though the agency's interpretation had not been formulated through an exercise of delegated
lawmaking authority. Id. at 596 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)).
Hence, Skidmore pointed out that the agency's views may possess the "power to persuade,"
even where those views lack the "power to control." Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. According
to Justice Breyer, the Court in Chevron did not significantly change the level of deference due
to an agency's interpretation; rather, the Court merely added a new reason for deferring to
agency interpretations, namely, that by enacting gaps and ambiguities, Congress had implicitly
delegated legal authority to the agency to make those interpretations. Christensen,529 U.S. at
596-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
' Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
131

"
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due. 3 8 While Christensen's"force of law" test was more complex
than Justice Scalia would have preferred in his concurring opinion,
it was infinitely less complex than what it was about to become.' 3 1
The following year, in UnitedStates v. Mead Corp.,'
the Court confirmed that it meant what it had said in Christensen:
Chevron deference would be appropriate when an agency undertook
notice and comment (or formal) rulemaking or formal adjudication,
but would likely be inappropriate when less deliberative procedures
were used.' 4' In Mead, the issue was whether the United States
Customs Service's (Customs) informal ruling letters were entitled
to Chevron deference.142 Mead imported planners.143 Customs
had classified the planners as "day planners" for several years; day
planners were tariff-free.'" Without warning, Customs changed
its interpretation and sent a letter informing Mead that the planners
would henceforth be considered "bound diaries," which were
subject to tariff.'4 Custom's ruling letters, which describe the
goods being imported and identify any applicable tariff amount, are
issued without any preliminary procedure, are not published, and
are non-binding.'4 6 Given the lack of procedures and non-binding
effect, the majority refused to defer under Chevron and used
Skidmore deference instead.14 7 In doing so, the majority reinforced
Christensen'sreasoning that Chevron applied only "when it appears
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the "force of law", and that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority." 48 Had the majority stopped there, many trees might
Id
See infra Part IV.
140 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
1'
Id. at 230-31.
141 Id at 226.
143 Id. at 224.
'" Id. at 224-25.
145 Id. at 225.
146 Id. at 223.
" Id. at 227.
14 Id. at 226-27.
138
139
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have been saved, for the "force of law" test was clear enough to
warrant little academic comment and, so far, Mead had offered
nothing new to the analysis.
But Mead did not stop there. Writing for the majority,
Justice Souter agreed that an explicit grant of notice and comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication authority would be "a very
good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment" because
"[i]t is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates
administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for
a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the
fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement
of such force." 49 Justice Souter then changed the analysis by
suggesting that the formality of the procedure alone was not
decisive: "[A]s significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing
to Chevron authority, the want of that procedure here does
not decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons for
Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality
was required and none was afforded."s 0 While Justice Souter
was absolutely correct that the Court had applied Chevron in the
past despite the lack of formal procedure, that application likely
occurred because the issue had not been raised directly.
In any event, without further explanation, Justice Souter
suggested that Chevron's application might be appropriate in
less procedurally prescribed situations. In other words, Justice
Souter added a new step to Christensen's "force of law" test:
"Delegation of such authority may be shown in variety of ways,
as by an agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-andcomment rulemaking, or by some other indicationof a comparable

19 Id. at 229-30; see David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron 's Nondelegation Doctrine,
2001 SUP. CT. REv. 201, 216-19 (2001) (arguing that whether Congress empowered
an agency with the power to issue binding rules and orders does not necessarily imply
anything about its intent regarding judicial deference and thus the Court's test regarding
whether an agency can take action with the "force of law" is misconceived).

1s0 Mead. 533 U.S. at 230-31.
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congressionalintent."is' Unfortunately, Justice Souter did not
elaborate on exactly what those other indications of comparable
congressional intent might be, shrouding the inquiry in mystery:
Prior to Mead, the test was bright-lined: Chevron
applied when the agency acted with more procedure,
and Skidmore applied when the agency acted with
less procedure. Now, the bright-line was blurring;
Mead suggested, without explaining, that some
agency actions might qualify for Chevron deference
even though the agency used less formal procedures.
Exactly what types of "other indication[s]" would be
sufficient to trigger Chevron was not readily apparent

from [Mead] alone.152
As for the ruling letters at issue in Mead, the Court reasoned
that there was simply no indication in the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule that Congress meant to delegate authority to the agency
to issue classification letters with the "force of law." 53 Moreover,
there were simply too many such rulings each year for Customs to
carefully and deliberately consider every issue.'5 Hence, Congress
could not have intended for the courts to apply Chevron deference.' 55
5
He
Justice Scalia scathingly dissented in a lengthy opinion.s'
criticized the majority's new test, saying, "[t]he Court's new doctrine
is neither sound in principle nor sustainable in practice."' Moreover,
he chastised the majority for resurrecting Skidmore.'5 1 Perhaps most

151

Id. at 227 (emphasis added).

5

JELLUM, supra note 7, at 220-2 1.

'

Mead, 533 U.S. at 233.

* Id. Forty-six different Customs offices issued 10,000 to 15,000 classifications each year.
Id. The Court also placed importance upon the fact that Customs regarded the classification
decisions as conclusive only between itself and the importer to whom it was issued. Id.
'5 Id. at 234.
156 Id. at 239-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 241.
I5s Id. at 250 (arguing that totality-of-the-circumstances Skidmore deference would create
excess litigation).
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ominously, he foreshadowed that "[w]e [would] be sorting out
the consequences of the Mead doctrine . .. for years to come."s 9
Justice Scalia iterated his view that deference to reasonable,
authoritative (or final) agency interpretations should be all or
nothing: either Chevron deference or no deference at all.""o In
response, Justice Souter was critical of Justice Scalia's preferred
test, suggesting that "Justice Scalia's first priority over the years
has been to limit and simplify [the Chevron doctrine]. The Court's
choice has been to tailor deference to variety."' 6 '
Despite Justice Scalia's heartfelt adherence to a
black-and-white world without Skidmore, he lost the battle.
Skidmore deference has returned to stay. Continuing its assault on
Chevron's applicability, the Court in 2002 again confirmed that
formality of procedure alone did not resolve the deference issue. In
Barnhartv. Walton,'6 1 the Court reaffirmed that "the fact that the
Agency previously reached its interpretation through means less
formal than 'notice and comment' rulemaking [did] not automatically
deprive that interpretation of the judicial deference otherwise its
due."" Importantly, for the first time, the Court identified some
factors that would show other indications of comparable congressional
intent sufficient to trigger Chevron deference.
In Barnhart,the Court had to determine how much, if any,
deference to give a Social Security Administration's regulation
interpreting the Social Security Act. 164 The regulation had been
issued after notice and comment rulemaking; hence, the majority,
written by Justice Breyer, applied Chevron deference.' 5 Indeed,
Justice Scalia concurred separately to note that because the
agency decision was reached as a result of notice and comment
15
160

Id. at 239 (citation omitted).
See id. at 239-61.

1'6 Id. at

236.
535 U.S. 212 (2002).
163 Id. at 221 (citation omitted).
'" Id. at 214-15.

162

161 Id.

at 222.
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rulemaking, Chevron applied.'" That was the sum total of his
analysis precisely because that was all that was needed to resolve
the case.
But it was not the end of Justice Breyer's analysis. Justice
Breyer, in dictum, took the opportunity to again reject the Christensen
formality dichotomy. Prior to issuing its regulation, the agency had
reached the same interpretation in less formal ways, including by
letter, by manual, and by informal adjudication.' 6 Indeed, the notice
and comment rulemaking had been promulgated only in response to
the pending litigation challenging the agency's interpretation.'" Both
the majority and concurring opinions found the fact that the agency
issued the regulation in response to the pending litigation irrelevant
to the deference analysis.169 But because the agency had previously
offered the same interpretation in less formal ways, Justice Breyer
turned to the question of whether Chevron deference would have been
appropriate had the agency not gone through the trouble of issuing the
notice and comment rulemaking during the litigation.' In dictum,
Justice Breyer was quick to affirm, without deciding in this case, that
even though the original interpretation was arrived at by less formal
procedures, such informality "[did] not automatically deprive that
interpretation of the judicial deference otherwise its due."'' This
statement was consistent with Mead.
Justice Breyer then identified a number of factors for courts
to use to determine whether Chevron analysis would be appropriate
when formal procedures were lacking. These factors included:
"[T]he interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise
Id. at 226-27 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 219-20. The Social Security Administration had originally issued the interpretation
in various interpretive documents, including a 1957 OASI Disability Insurance Letter, a 1965
Disability Insurance State Manual, and a 1982 Social Security Ruling. Id
i6 Id. at 217.
concurring).
16 Id. at 222; id. at 226-27 (Scalia, J.,
l'

167

170Id. at 221-22.
'17Id. at 221. Further, Justice

Breyer used the opportunity to resurrect the point of his
dissent in Christensen, namely that Skidmore and Chevron are not different standards, but
rather provide different rationales for deferring to agency interpretations. Id. at 221-22.
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of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of
the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful
consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period
of time .... "17 Simply put, (1) the more difficult the issue and the

regulatory scheme, (2) the more experience the agency has in the
particular area, (3) the more important resolution of this issue is to
the agency's ability to administer a program, and finally, (4) the more
carefully the agency considers the interpretation, the more likely that
Congress intended courts to defer to the agency. Interestingly, some
of these factors "are eerily reminiscent of pre-Chevron days [where]
the more reasoned and considered the agency opinion, the more
deference due."' 73 Thus, Chevron applies when Congress explicitly
or implicitly shows that it wants Chevron to apply:
[I]f Chevron rests on a presumption about
congressional intent, then Chevron should apply
only where Congress would want Chevron to
apply. In delineating the types of delegations of
agency authority that trigger Chevron deference,
it is therefore important to determine whether a
plausible case can be made that Congress would
want such a delegation to mean that agencies enjoy
primary interpretational authority. 74
According to the Christensen-Mead-Barnharttrilogy,
deliberateness of procedure is merely one indication, among many,
that Congress intended deference. If the dictum in Barnhartholds,
and it is by no means certain that it will, then Chevron deference
applies both (1) when Congress delegates relatively formal procedures
and the agency uses them and (2) when Congress provides other
evidence that it intended courts to defer to the agency interpretation.17s
"7 Id. at 222.
"7 Jellum, supra note 5, at 777.

"1 Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 872 (2001).
"7 As one scholar has noted:

[After] Christensen,Mead, and Barnhart,the real question is Congress's (implied)
instructions in the particularstatutory scheme. The grant of authority to act with
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Although these two options seem straightforward in
application, they are not.' 6 Barnharthas not aided clarity
for either the lower courts or the classroom. 177 While the
Gray-Hearst-O'Learydeference two-track was relatively
clear, Chevron's two-step deference was relatively clear, and
Christensen's"force-of-law" dichotomy was relatively clear,
Mead and Barnhartare anything but. According to Barnhart,
the appropriate level of deference is based on what a court thinks
Congress intended; which can be problematic." In any event,
despite the Supreme Court's rhetoric, to date the Court has not
applied Chevron to an agency interpretation lacking the "force-oflaw."' 79 However, lower courts have done so. 80 Perhaps all the
scholarly criticism about Mead is much ado about nothing?'

the "force of law" is a sufficient but not necessary condition for a court to find that
Congress has granted an agency the power to interpret ambiguous statutory terms.
Sunstein, supra note 10, at 218.
176 See Beerman, supra note 8, at 781-82 (stating that "the Chevron doctrine: as a legal
doctrine,... has proven to be a complete and total failure").
17 See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 219-21 (noting, with examples, how the Step Zero
trilogy has produced much complexity in lower court rulings).
"7 Not all scholars agree on what the appropriate level of deference is:
That Congress's delegatory intent must sometimes be sought through inference
and construction, rather than from direct manifestations of congressional will,
does not diminish the indispensability of this inquiry. Under our system of limited
government, an agency cannot announce actions that bind citizens and the courts
unless Congress has delegated to it the authority to do so.
Anthony, supra note 132, at 5.
". See Ala. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 U.S. 461, 487-88
(2004) (refusing to apply Chevron deference because the agency interpretation appeared
in an internal guidance memorandum which does not carry the "force of law"); see also
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 165-73 (2007) (applying Chevron
deference to the agency's notice and comment regulation even though the agency
identified the regulations as only interpretative).
'" See Schuetz v. Banc One Mortgage Corp., 292 F.3d 1004, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that a Statement of Policy from Housing and Urban Development was entitled to Chevron
deference based on an analysis of the Barnhartfactors); see also Bressman, supra note 9, at
1457-69 (reviewing appellate cases that attempt to reconcile Mead,Barnhart,and Chevron).
' See, e.g., Bressman, supranote 9, at 1486-91 (offering an alternative to the "MeadMess").
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D. Can the Agency Interpret the Statute?
But apparently the Court did not believe that the
Christensen-Mead-Barnharttrilogy was sufficiently complex to
resolve the deference question. During the same years that this
trilogy was being decided, the Supreme Court further limited
Chevron's applicability in another trilogy of cases beginning with
Food andDrugAdministration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.,' including Gonzales v. Oregon,'" and ending with
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.184 In this trilogy, the Court added a new step
to the Chevron Step Zero: that of determining whether Congress
had intended to delegate interpretive authority at all. In all three
cases, the Court held that Congress did not delegate interpretive
power to the agency despite gaps and ambiguities in the statute.'85
In Chevron, one of the Court's rationales for deferring to
the agency's interpretation was that by enacting gaps and creating
ambiguities, Congress intended, albeit implicitly, to delegate to the
agency.' 86 But in this trilogy, starting with Brown & Williamson,
the Court rejected, or at least limited, this rationale:'"8
Deference under Chevron to an agency's construction
of a statute that it administers is premised on the
theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit
delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the
statutory gaps. In extraordinary cases, however, there
may be reason to hesitate before concluding that
Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.
[Brown & Williamson] is hardly an ordinary case.' 88
'8 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
'8 546 U.S. 243 (2006).

548 U.S. 557 (2006).
...Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132-33; Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267; Hamdan, 548
U.S. at 578.
' Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
'8 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159-61.
'" Id. at 159 (citations omitted).
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Specifically, in 2000, the same year that Christensenwas
decided, the majority rejected the Food and Drug Administration's
(FDA) attempt to regulate tobacco in Brown & Williamson.'8"
The FDA was authorized to regulate "drugs," "devices," and
"combination products."9 0 The statute defined these terms as
"'articles . .. intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body."" 91 Considering nicotine to be a drug, the FDA concluded
that it had authority to regulate.'92 Thus, the FDA interpreted this
broad language as allowing it to regulate tobacco and cigarettes.'9
Disagreeing, big tobacco sued.
The Supreme Court rejected the FDA's decision to
regulate.19 4 The FDA had acted with "force of law", specifically by
enacting regulations through notice and comment rulemakings.'"9
However, the issue, according to the Court was not whether the
FDA's interpretation was entitled to deference under Chevron's first
or second step, but whether the agency could act at all; a Step Zero
question.' 96 Despite the fact that the language of the statute alone
was broad enough to support the agency's interpretation and that
the agency had acted with "force of law" procedures, the majority
concluded "that Congress ha[d] directly spoken to the issue here and
precluded the FDA's jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products."' 7
The majority supported its holding by noting that Congress had:
(1) created a distinct regulatory scheme for tobacco products;
(2) squarely rejected proposals to give the FDA jurisdiction over
tobacco; and (3) acted repeatedly to preclude other agencies from
exercising authority in this area.'98

189

Id. at 159-61.

1o Id. at 126.
'"

Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C.

§ 321 (g)(1)(C)).

'9 Id. at 125.

Id.
Id. at
'9 Id. at
'g9 Id. at
'9 Id. at
'"9 Id. at
'

'9

126, 133.
126-27.
132.
133.
155-56.
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After concluding that Chevron deference was inappropriate,
the Court did not even consider whether the lesser, Skidmore,
deference would be appropriate, perhaps because Mead and
Barnharthad not yet been decided. 199 In Brown & Williamson
then, the majority held that while Congress may not have spoken
to the precise issue, it had spoken broadly enough on related
issues to prevent the agency from acting at all. 00 No deference
whatsoever (neither Skidmore nor Chevron) was accorded the
agency's interpretation, even though the agency used "force of
law" procedures.
Six years later, in Gonzales v. Oregon,2 o' the Court refused
to apply Chevron to the Attorney General's interpretation of
the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. The issue before the
Court was "whether the Controlled Substances Act allow[ed]
the United States Attorney General to prohibit doctors from
prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide,
notwithstanding a state law permitting the procedure."20 2 The
Attorney General's interpretive rule had been developed through
informal procedures.2 03 The Justices disagreed over whether
the Attorney General's interpretation was entitled to Chevron
deference. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, reasoned
that because Congress had not intended the Attorney General
to have interpretative power in this area, Congress had not
delegated this issue to the agency: "The idea that Congress gave
the Attorney General such broad and unusual authority through
an implicit delegation in the [Act's] registration provision is not
sustainable."204 Hence, Chevron deference was inappropriate.

'" Id at 133. Justice Breyer dissented and found that the statute's language and general
purpose both supported the FDA's finding that cigarettes were within its statutory
authority. Id. at 161-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
200

Id. at 155-56.

201

546 U.S. 243 (2006).
Id. at 248-49.
Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 267.

202
203
204
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Unlike Brown & Williamson, where the Court refused to
defer at all, this time the majority determined that the interpretation
was entitled to some deference, albeit only Skidmore deference.2 os
At this point, the Christensen-Mead-Barnharttrilogy had been
decided and so the Gonzales Court, following Christensen's
"force of law" direction, applied Skidmore.2 0 6 Yet, the majority
concluded that even applying this lesser form of deference, the
Attorney General's interpretation was unsustainable.20 7 Given the
importance of the issue to the nation, the majority was particularly
skeptical of the Attorney General's attempt to backdoor its overly
broad interpretation of the statute.208 Thus, the majority rejected
the Attorney General's interpretation after applying Skidmore's
"power-to-persuade" deference test.20 9
A frustrated Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that the
interpretation was entitled to Chevron deference because Congress
had delegated authority to "control" controlled substances. 210 He
added that even if the interpretation were entitled to no deference,
"the most reasonable interpretation of the Regulation and of the
statute would produce the same result."2 1
Finally, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,2 n the Court, for a third
time, hinted that deference was not always appropriate despite
broad statutory language. In this case, the Court rejected President
Bush's executive order creating military commissions for "enemy
combatant[s] "13 The commissions were established after the
205

Id. at 268.

Id.
Id.
208 Id. at 272.
209 Id. at 272-75. A particularly scathing Justice Scalia dissented.
Id at 275-99 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). He argued that the interpretation was entitled to Chevron deference and that
even if the interpretation was not entitled to deference, "the most reasonable interpretation
of the Regulation and of the statute would produce the same result." Id. at 285.
210 Id. at 281-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206
207

'" Id. at 285.
212
213

548 U.S. 557 (2006).
Id. at 567, 570.
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tragic events of 9/11: First, Congress adopted a joint resolution,

granting the President the power to "'use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks."' 2 14 Second, acting pursuant to this resolution,
President Bush issued the "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism" order, which
provided that any non-citizens determined to be members of al
Qaeda or terrorists would be tried by military commission.2 1 s
Hamdan, a Yemeni national who had been detained at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and who had been charged with various
terrorism-related offenses, was set for trial before a military
commission pursuant to the President's order. 16 He petitioned
for habeas relief.217 The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia granted the petition. 2 1s The government
appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, reversed. 219 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed. The relevant issue for purposes of this article
was whether, and to what extent, the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) authorized the President to establish procedures
for military commissions that were different from the procedures
for traditional court martials. 2 20 The UCMJ explicitly provided
that the procedures for the two proceedings should be the same,
so far as "practicable." 22 ' Yet, persons subject to trial by military
Id. at 568 (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, 115 Stat. 224, note
following 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2000 & Supp. III)).
"s Id. (citing 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001)).
216 Id. at 566.
214

"I Id. at 567.

Id.
Id.
220 See id. (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq.).
121 Id. at 620 ('The procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts-martial,
courts of inquiry, military commissions, and other military tribunals may be prescribed by the
President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of
law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United
States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter."'
(quoting Article 36(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq.)).
218
219
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commissions could not confront the evidence against them while
persons subject to trial by court martial could.' The Government
argued:
[First, that] military commissions would be of no use
if the President were hamstrung by those provisions of
the UCMJ that govern courts-martial. [Second, that] the
President's determination that 'the danger to the safety
of the United States and the nature of international
terrorism' renders it impracticable 'to apply in military
comnussions ... the principles of law and the rules of
evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal
cases in the United States district courts' is, in the
Government's view, explanation enough for any
deviation from court-martial procedures.223
The Court rejected both arguments and concluded, on
its own authority, that the procedures the President established
for the military commissions violated the UCMJ.2 24 Moreover,
even though the UCMJ language gave the President broad
flexibility to determine what procedures were "practicable" and
when uniformity would be required, the majority applied neither
Chevron nor Skidmore deference to resolve the issue. 25
Thus, in the Brown & Williamson-Gonzales-Hamdan
trilogy, the Court concluded that there are situations when
Congress does not intend to delegate interpretive authority to an

Id. at 621.
Id. at 622 (citation omitted) (quoting 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001)).
224 Id. at 622-25. Cf Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (failing to apply Chevron
or Skidmore in evaluating the President's interpretation of Congress's joint resolution
entitled Authorization for the Use of Military Force).
us See generally Deborah N. Pearlstein, A Measure of Deference: Justice Stevens from
Chevron to Hamdan, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1063, 1070 (2010) (arguing that the "mere
assertion of authority without a clear indication of process, without a clear reliance on
actual expertise, [and] without a contextual factual record simply wasn't enough" for
either deference standard).
22

223

103

Veterans Law Review [Vol. 3: 20111

agency at all, despite gaps and ambiguities. When Congress did
not intend to delegate, then no deference, or only limited, Skidmore
deference, would be due. These holdings were surprising because
in Chevron, the Court had based its decision to defer to agencies,
in part, on the notion that Congress implicitly intends for agencies
to fill gaps and ambiguities in the statutes they administer.2 7 Yet,
in each of these cases, the Court limited Chevron's reach. Prior
to these cases, courts could assume that when Congress left a gap
or drafted ambiguously, Congress intended, albeit implicitly, to
delegate the power to interpret the statute to the agency. After
these cases, courts must first ensure that Congress actually
intended to delegate the interpretive power: gaps and ambiguities
are no longer enough.
E. Understanding Chevron's Step Zero
Pre-Mead,the deference choice seemed relatively clear: An
agency received Chevron deference when it reached an
interpretation only after using legislative rulemaking or formal
adjudication. All other interpretations were entitled to Skidmore
deference. But Mead and Barnhartsuggested that at least some
interpretations reached through non-legislative rulemaking might
receive Chevron deference. Whether the agency acts with "force
of law" is no longer the exclusive test; rather, the test is whether
Congress intended the courts to defer to the agency in light of
the "interpretive method used" and the "nature of the question at
issue." Whereas Chevron and Christensenestablished bright line
rules that provided some certainty, Barnhartand Mead returned
the analysis to a case by case approach, similar to Skidmore's
"power-to-persuade" test. Predictability was lost.

See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 281(2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining
that the majority had ignored "the implicit delegation inherent in Congress's use of the
undefined term 'prescription"' in the Controlled Substances Act).
227 Jellum, supra note 5, at 741 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
226
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And then there is the Brown & Williamson-Gonzales-Hamdan
trilogy. Even when an agency uses "force of law" procedures,
Chevron still may not apply if a fundamental issue is involved;
one that goes to the heart of the regulatory scheme at issue and
one that Congress would not have intended to delegate to the
agency. Indeed, Brown & Williamson and Hamdan both implied
that even Skidmore deference was not applicable in these cases.
However, the majority in Gonzales, which was decided after
Mead and Barnhart,did apply Skidmore deference to a similar
issue. Gonzales is the better approach to these issues for two
reasons; first, it appears the members of the Court in Brown &
Williamson and Hamdan did not even consider whether Skidmore
deference would be appropriate. Second, because Skidmore
deference requires a court do little more than consider the agency's
interpretation, a court can relatively easily reject that interpretation
if the interpretation is inconsistent with the regulatory scheme.
Indeed, the Court in Gonzales did just that.228 Because agencies
have expertise, have access to data and information, and are
politically accountable, their input is relevant even if not
decisive.
At this point, you may wonder how to reconcile all
the sub-steps in Chevron's Step Zero. Assuming the agency
is interpreting a statute that that agency has sole authority to
administer, then the following four-step approach should be
applied. First, ask whether Congress intended to delegate the
specific issue to the agency at all. If the issue is one of such major
importance that Congress never intended to delegate, then the
agency likely has no power to interpret the statute. Such a finding
should be rare. This step is based on the holdings in Brown &
Williamson, Gonzales, and Hamdan. If Congress did not intend to
delegate, then, Skidmore deference should apply regardless of the
procedure the agency used.230
2"

Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 275.

229

Id. at 255.

23o

Id. at 256.
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Second, assuming Congress did intend to delegate
interpretive power to the agency, determine whether Congress
intended the courts to defer to that agency's interpretation. To do
so, look first to the type of agency action at issue. In other words,
look to see if the agency acted with "force of law." If the agency
interpreted the statute during notice and comment rulemaking,
formal rulemaking, or formal adjudication, then Chevron deference
231
is appropriate. This step is based on the holding in Christensen.
Third, determine whether Chevron deference is appropriate
even though "force of law" procedures were not used. To do so,
determine whether Congress intended Chevron to apply as shown
by the Barnhartfactors. Those factors include (1) the interstitial
nature of the legal question, (2) the relevance of the agency's
expertise, (3) the importance of the question to administration of
the statute, (4) the complexity of the statutory scheme, and (5)
the careful consideration the agency has given the question over a
long period of time. If these factors suggest that Congress did not
intend for courts to defer, then Chevron is inapplicable. Instead,
apply Skidmore's "power-to-persuade" test. This step is based on
the holdings from Mead and Barnhart.
Fourth, apply the appropriate deference standard. If you
determined at step three that Chevron should apply, then using
traditional tools of statutory interpretation, ask whether Congress
has spoken to the precise issue before the court. This is Chevron's
See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S.
212 (2002).
233 Should a court turn to the agency's interpretation only after first exhausting all possible
sources
of meaning or only after viewing just the text? Chevron suggested the former. According
to the Court, clarity should be determined by "employing traditional tools of statutory
construction." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
n.9 (1984). And in the years following Chevron, the Court generally first looked searchingly for
legislative intent at step one. Jellum, supranote 5, at 747. But in 1986, Justice Scalia joined the
Supreme Court. Soon after Justice Scalia joined the bench, the Court's Chevron rhetoric changed.
The Court's inquiry at step one became more focused on the text. Today, Chevron's first step has
been transformed from a search for legislative intent into a search for textual clarity. Id.
131

232
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step one. If Congress has spoken, then analysis is complete for
Congress has the authority to interpret its own statutes when it so
chooses. But if Congress has not directly spoken to the precise
issue, if Congress has left a gap or impliedly delegated to the agency,
then proceed to Chevron's second step: Ask whether the agency's
interpretation is reasonable in light of the underlying law. If the
agency's interpretation is unreasonable, no deference is due. If the
agency's interpretation is reasonable, full deference is due.m
"Some writers fault the textualist approach for causing Justice Scalia to cede too much
authority to federal agencies under Chevron." Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism
and the Chevron Doctrine:In Defense ofJustice Scalia,28 CoNN. L. REv. 393, 394 (1996)
(presenting various views on Justice Scalia's adherence to textualism); see, e.g., Bernard
Schwartz, "Shooting the PianoPlayer"? JusticeScalia andAdministrativeLaw, 47 ADMN.
L. REV. 1, 50 (1995) (discussing administrative law principles through use of Justice Scalia's
opinions); Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L.
REv. 405, 430 n.91 (1989) (suggesting that textualism under Chevron would substantially
increase the Executive's power); Nicholas S. Zeppos, JusticeScalia s Textualism: The "New"
New Legal Process, 12 CARDozo L. REv. 1597, 1639 (1991) (suggesting that textualism
encompasses more than just Justice Scalia's views); Arthur Stock, Note, Justice Scalia s
Use of Sources in Statutory and ConstitutionalInterpretation:How CongressAlways Loses,
1990 DUKE L.J. 160, 188 ("Justice Scalia recognizes that textualism with statutes reduces the
power of individual Members of Congress .... "); Shane M. Sorenson, Note, Immigration and

Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca: Two Steps in the Right Direction,3 ADMIN. L.J. 95,
125 (1989) (explaining how Justice Scalia's interpretation of Chevron "suggests that Congress
should be presumed to have delegated lawmaking authority to an agency whenever legislators
fail to clearly spell out their intentions"); William D. Popkin, Law-Making Responsibilityand
Statutory Interpretation,68 IND. L.J. 865, 872 n.36 (1993) (calling Justice Scalia a "surface
textualist" who accepts the text as the law for the purpose of avoiding judicial responsibility);
Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Futureofthe Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 315,
354 (1994) ("[T]extualism poses a threat to the future of the deference doctrine.").
Other writers "contend that, because of his adherence to textualism, Justice Scalia too
often fails to defer to administrative agencies under the Chevron doctrine." Maggs, supra,at
394 (citing Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretationsand Deferencefor Justice
Scalia, 12 CARDozo L. REv. 1663, 1670 (1991)); see Jonathan D. Newman, Note, Lechmere,
Inc. v. NLRB: Plain Meaning and the SupremeAdministrativeAgency, 4 MD. J. CoNTEMP.
LEGAL IssuEs 287, 288 (1993) (arguing that the Court occasionally manipulates the Chevron
doctrine to reverse agency and executive policy that the Court opposes); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
The Supreme Court s New Hypertextualism:An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherencein
the Administrative State, 95 CoLUtM. L. REv. 749, 752 (1995) (averring that a hypertextualist
method of statutory construction will lead to incoherence in the administrative state).
m34
For an interesting approach to Chevron's second step, see Ronald M. Levin, The
Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered,72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1253, 1254-55
(1997) (suggesting that there should be no difference between Chevron's second step and
arbitrary and capricious review under § 706(2)(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act).
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If, instead, you determined at step three that Skidmore
should apply, then apply the Skidmore's "power-to-persuade" factors
to the agency's interpretation. The agency's interpretation is entitled
to deference based on the following factors: (1) the consistency
in the agency's interpretation over time; (2) the thoroughness of
the agency's consideration; and (3) the soundness of the agency's
reasoning. 235 Deference under this standard is earned, not
automatic. 3

The cases above all addressed what level of deference, if any, a court should give to
an agency interpretation when there are no pre-existing judicial interpretations of the
same statute. The obvious next question is what if there is a prior judicial opinion? Prior
judicial opinions exist when a court is forced to interpret the meaning of a statutory
provision when the agency has not yet rendered an interpretation of it. The issue for a
court is whether thereafter the agency is bound to follow a court's interpretation or the
agency is free to make its own interpretation. The Court resolved this issue in National
Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. BrandX Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
In that case, the Court held that if the prior court had determined that the statute was
clear under Chevron's first step, then the agency is bound by that judicial interpretation.
Id. at 982-83. But, if the court did not decide that the statute was clear, then the court's
interpretation would not bind the agency. Id. In other words, a court's interpretation
does not eliminate a pre-existing ambiguity. The court's decision merely reflects a
determination that either there is no ambiguity or that there is ambiguity. If there is no
ambiguity, then Congress has spoken and the agency, as well as the courts, must abide
by Congress's intent. But if the statute is ambiguous, then when a court issues the first
interpretation of an ambiguous statute, the agency is not bound by that interpretation.
236 Understanding the difference between Chevron and Skidmore in application is not
always easy. Professor Gary Lawson has offered a way of thinking of the difference,
which he defines as the difference between legal deference and epistemological
deference. Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional:The Case Against Precedent
Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 2-10 (2007). Legal deference is deference earned
solely based on the identity of the interpreter and method of interpretation. Id. at 9. For
example, lower courts must defer to interpretations of higher courts within the same
jurisdiction, but need not defer to interpretations from courts in other jurisdictions
solely because of the identity of the decisionmaker. Chevron deference is a form of
legal deference: agencies earn deference simply because they are agencies and they
interpret statutes in a particular way. In contrast, epistemological deference is deference
earned because of the persuasiveness of the reasoning. Id. at 10. Courts in neighboring
jurisdictions need not follow each other's opinions, but can choose to do so because the
reasoning is persuasive. Skidmore deference is a form of epistemological deference:
agencies earn deference based on the soundness of their reasoning, but deference is not
automatic.
235
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Not all academic administrative law experts would agree
that this simplified, four step process completely or even accurately
captures Chevron Step Zero analysis. Rightly, they would note that
the interaction of these cases is extremely complex. Illustratively,
one scholar has stated that the "force of law" phrase is one of the
most confusing in administrative law."' Another has stated that
"Mead is not particularly coherent and raises tough issues about
when Chevron does (should) apply."m3 8 A recent discussion on
the lawprof list serv makes clear that even the experts disagree
on exactly how to understand and reconcile these cases. These
experts are correct; Chevron's Step Zero is a mess. Yet the lower
courts-judges in the field-need help with the guidance the
Supreme Court has provided to date, even if that guidance is less
clear than it could or even should be. This article and the four step
process present my attempt to provide that help.
IV. THE VETERANS COURT & CHEVRON
As we have seen, agencies play a leading role in statutory
interpretation. Throughout the last forty years, the Court has
struggled with the appropriate level of deference to give agency
interpretations. This struggle reflects the Court's concern with
interpretive power and the appropriate role for the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government. While the
members of the executive and legislative branches are generally
accountable to the public, and members of the judiciary are not, it
is the judiciary who says what the law is. 39 This tension permeates
the jurisprudence in this area. Yet, underlying this tension is respect
Posting of Richard Murphy, richard.murphy@ttu.edu, to owner-adminlaw@
chicagokent.kentlaw.edu (June 11, 2010) (on file with author).
231 Posting of Mark Seidenfeld, MSeidenf@law.fsu.edu, to owner-adminlaw@
chicagokent.kentlaw.edu (June 11, 2010) (on file with author). For his view about the
role of Mead, Barnhart, and Christensen, see Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron ' Foundation
7 (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 403, 2009), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cftm?abstract-id=1489982 (stating "[i]f Mead is
confused, the Supreme Court's later decision in Barnhartv. Walton is downright perverse
when viewed with a focus on congressional intent" (footnote omitted)).
239 See supra Part t.
13
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for the role that agencies play and for their legal interpretations. In
the veterans' arena, this respect may be getting lost. The Veterans
Court does not, on balance, defer to the VA.
The Veterans Court approaches Chevron in some unusual
and inapposite ways. First, the Veterans Court does not apply
Chevron's Step Zero analysis, or, if it does, the Veterans Court is
not clear that it is so doing. Second, the Veterans Court applies
an unusual "tie to the veteran" rule (Gardner'spresumption) that
conflicts with Chevron.24 o Moreover, the Veterans Court seems less
deferential to the VA's interpretations than Chevron, Skidmore, and
Auer would suggest. I discuss each point below in more detail.
A. The Veterans Court & Chevron's Step Zero
First, the Veterans Court is not using the Chevron doctrine of
today, or if the Veterans Court is using Chevron correctly, then it is
not explaining itself clearly. Specifically, the Veterans Court does
not clearly apply Chevron's Step Zero, including Christensen's
"force of law" analysis, 24 ' Barnhart'sfactors analysis, and Brown
& Williamson's initial inquiry: did Congress intend to defer in the
first place.242 In almost every case decided in the past year that
involves the VA's interpretation of a statute, the Veterans Court,
without explanation, applies Chevron or Skidmore.2 43
See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994).
See, e.g., McCormick v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 39, 47 (2000) (citing Chevron, but failing
to articulate the two step analysis or examine the force-of-law inquiry).
242 The Veterans Court has not directly addressed this issue; however, in one case, the
Veterans Court did conclude that the Secretary had authority to issue substantive, as opposed
to procedural, regulations. See Robinson v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 440 (2009). In that case,
the relevant statute authorized the Secretary "'to prescribe all rules and regulationswhich
are necessaryand appropriateto carry out the laws administered by the Department ...
including. . . ." Id. at 443 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006)). Because this general rule was
then followed by four examples that were all procedural, the surviving spouse argued that the
Secretary did not have authority to issue substantive rules. Id. The Veterans Court rejected the
argument, finding the examples illustrative and not restrictive. Id. at 444-45.
243
say almost because in some cases, the Veterans Court does not apply either Chevmn or
Skiddnore. For example, in Robinson, the Veterans Court did not discuss deference at all. In
that case, the Secretary had issued a regulation regarding whether benefits were available when
240

24'
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For example, in Osman v. Peake,2 4 the Veterans Court noted
that Skidmore deference was the appropriate analysis for reviewing a
VA General Counsel opinion that interpreted a statute.245 However, the
Veterans Court never explained why Skidmore, rather than Chevron,
was the appropriate standard.1 6 The issue in Osman was whether the
son of two permanently disabled veterans was entitled to one dependent
educational benefit or whether he was entitled to two separate awards,
one based on each parent's disability.2 47 The text of the relevant statute
provided: "'Each eligible person shall . .. be entitled to receive
educational assistance."' 2 4 8 "Person" in the statute was defined as
a "'child of a person who, as a result of qualifying service ... has
a disability permanent in nature resulting from a service-connected
disability."' 2 49 The VA General Counsel had, prior to the case, issued
a "precedent opinion" interpreting the term "eligible person" in the
statute to prohibit dual awards.2 so VA General Counsel precedential
opinions are binding on the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board);
hence, the Board denied the son's request for benefits based on the
mother's disability because the son had already received benefits
based on his father's disability. 2I
a surviving spouse had killed her veteran husband. Robinson, 22 Vet. App. at 44142. The Board
had denied benefits under its regulation because the spouse had entered a nolo contendereplea to
a manslaughter charge in state court. Id. at 442. However, on appeal, the Secretary agreed with
the spouse that the issue should be remanded for further factfinding: .'[T]he Board's reliance upon
appellant's conviction alone as the determinative factor regarding whether she wrongfully and
intentionally caused the veteran's death under these circumstances is not sustainable and the Board's
decision should be remanded.' Id. at 444 (quoting Secretary's Brief at 9). The Veterans Court did
not defer to the Secretary's position at all; neither Chevn norSkidmor was mentioned. Instead, the
Veterans Court simply ignored the Secretary's position, found the conviction sufficient, and affirmed
the Board's decision to deny benefits. Id. at 447. It seems odd that the Veterans Court did not even
consider whether deference was due to the Secretary's position on appeal. See Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945) (saying that deference should be afforded even when the
agency announces its interpretation of its regulation for the first time in litigation documents).
'
22 Vet. App. 252 (2008).
24 Id. at 256.
141 See id; cf Sursely v. Peake, 551 F3d 1351, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating, without
explaining,
that Slicknow analysis was appropriate to apply to an advisory opinion interpreting a statute).
247 Osman, 22 Vet. App. at
253.
248 Id. at 255 (omission in original) (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 3510
(2006)).
29 Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 3501 (a)(1)(A)(i-ii)).
2so Id. at 256 (quoting DVA Op. Gen. Counsel Prec. 1-2002, at 1 (Jan. 25, 2002)).
5 Id. at 256-57 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7104(c)).
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The Veterans Court reversed the Board's denial.2 s2 In
doing so, the Veterans Court noted that it reviewed VA statutory
interpretations de novo and that Skidmore deference applied."'
Pursuant to Skidmore, the Veterans Court noted that it would
defer to the VA's interpretation to the extent the interpretation
was persuasive because "such opinions do constitute a body
of experience and informed judgment." 4 The Veterans Court
then correctly identified the Skidmore factors: "thoroughness,
reasoning, and consistency with earlier and later pronouncements
on the specific issue."2s5 After reviewing the statutory language,
the Veterans Court found the VA's interpretation unpersuasive and
inconsistent; hence, it rejected the VA's interpretation entirely. 256
The Veterans Court's initial statements were both correct
and incorrect. It was incorrect that it should review agency
interpretations of statutes de novo. Agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes are entitled to deference, under either Chevron
or Skidmore.25 7 Indeed, in its next sentence, the Veterans Court
recognized that some deference was due, choosing Skidmore
deference.2 s8 And while the Veterans Court was likely correct-that
Skidmore and not Chevron was the appropriate deference standard-it
never explained why Skidmore rather than Chevron was appropriate.259
Specifically, the Veterans Court never examined whether the VA
had acted with "force of law," nor whether the Barnhartfactors
suggested that Chevron should apply. Instead, it simply identified
Skidmore as the appropriate deference standard and moved on.26 o

"

Id. at 257.

Id. at 256.
" Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
ss Id.
%Id. at 256-60.
2
See supra Parts II, Ill.
11

25

Osman, 22 Vet. App. at 256.

z' Id. The Veterans Court noted that the Secretary agreed that "the correct standard of
deference in this matter is governed by Skidmore." Id. at 254 n.3.
260 Id. at 256.
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The Veterans Court's Skidmore choice was likely correct.
Let's see why using the four-step approach identified earlier.26 Using
this approach, a court should ask first whether Congress intended
to delegate the specific issue to the agency. Here, Congress had
specifically delegated to the VA the power to make rules related to
benefits;262 thus, there would be no Brown & Williamson concern.
Next a court should ask whether Congress intended the
courts to defer to the VA's interpretation under either Christensen's
"force of law" test or Barnhart'sfactors test. 6 Here, the VA
opinions were not enacted pursuant to any procedurally prescribed
process (neither informal or formal rulemaking nor formal
adjudication);2 6 hence, under Christensen,Chevron deference
is not appropriate. In addition, the Barnhartfactors suggest that
Skidmore is appropriate, although the outcome of this analysis
is much less clear and simple. The Barnhartfactors include the
following: (1) the interstitial nature of the legal question, (2) the
relevance of the agency's expertise, (3) the importance of the
question to administration of the statute, (4) the complexity of the
statutory scheme, and (5) the careful consideration the agency has
given the question over a long period of time. 6 In short, who
would Congress likely have intended to answer this question:
the judiciary or the agency? In this case, Congress likely did not
intend for the VA to have final say. The issue does not appear
to be essential to the VA's administration of its program, and
the VA's expertise in this area does not seem to be essential to
resolving the ambiguity in the statute, although these are close
questions. Moreover, it appears that the agency considered the
261 See supra Part II.A.
262
2

38 U.S.C.

§ 501(a) (2006).

See supra Part III.C.

" Osman, 22 Vet. App. at 254.
265 Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S.

212, 222 (2002). Or, as I noted earlier, (1) the more
difficult the issue and the regulatory scheme, (2) the more experience the agency has
in the particular area, (3) the more important resolution of this issue is to the agency's
ability to administer a program, and finally, (4) the more carefully the agency considers
the interpretation, the more likely that Congress intended courts to defer to the agency.
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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interpretation in response to a prior inconsistent position, but we
do not know from the opinion how carefully the interpretation was
considered. 66 Thus, under either Christensen's "force of law"
test or Barnhart'sfactors test, the Veterans Court would likely
have found that Congress did not expect the court to defer under
Chevron to VA General Counsel precedent opinions. The more
important issue in this case is not whether the choice was correct,
but rather that the analysis was missing.
The final step in the process is to apply the selected standard
accurately. 67 Here, the Veterans Court needed to apply Skidmore
by examining three factors: (1) the consistency in the agency
interpretation over time; (2) the thoroughness of the agency's
consideration; and (3) the soundness of the agency's reasoning. In
its opinion, the Veterans Court did mention the consistency of the
agency's interpretation over time. In doing so, the Veterans Court
found that the VA was inconsistent because it had interpreted the
statute once in an advisory opinion to allow multiple benefits before
it issued General Counsel Precedential Opinion 1-2002.270 For the
Veterans Court, one different interpretation was sufficient to find that
the VA had been inconsistent.7
Even assuming the Veterans Court was correct-that one
prior contradictory interpretation made the VA inconsistent-the
Veterans Court did not clearly analyze the other two factors. Instead,
the Veterans Court turned to Chevron's first step, determining
whether Congress had directly spoken to the issue.272 Chevron
simply has no role when Skidmore is the appropriate deference
See Osman, 22 Vet. App. at 259-60.
See supra Part III.C.
261 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
269 Osman, 22 Vet. App. at 259-60.
270 Id. at 259-60. It appears that the award of multiple benefits on one occasion led the
VA to issue the precedential opinion at issue in the case. See DVA Op. Gen. Counsel
Prec. 1-2002, at 1 (Jan. 25, 2002).
271 Id.
127 Id. at 257 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S.
837, 842 (1984)).
26z

167
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standard, not even as a citation. Essentially, in this part of its
analysis, the Veterans Court determined what it thought the statute
meant and concluded that the VA's interpretation was unpersuasive
simply because the VA had come to a different conclusion. 7 Hence,
in Osman, the Veterans Court neither explained why Skidmore was
the appropriate deference standard, nor applied Skidmore accurately.
And in doing so, the Veterans Court did not defer to the VA.
Similarly, in Wanless v. Shinseki,2 74 the Veterans Court
again noted, without explanation, that Skidmore deference
applied to interpretations of VA General Counsel precedential
opinions.275 The Veterans Court cited Osman for support of its
Yet in Wanless, the Veterans Court
choice and its reasoning.
upheld the VA's interpretation, whereas it had rejected the VA's
interpretation in Osman.27
In Wanless, the issue was whether a privately owned
prison qualified as a "'Federal, State, or local penal institution."'
The Veterans Court found this language ambiguous, suggesting
that the language "[did] not explicitly include or exclude private

278

To interpret the statute, the Veterans Court examined the text of the statute and explored
the statutory context. Id. at 255-56. The Veterans Court found "the applicable statutes, and
amendments thereto" clear. Id. at 258. In addition, the Veterans Court examined the codified
purpose, which stated that the purpose of the statute at issue was to "'provid[e] opportunities
for education to children whose education would otherwise be impeded or interrupted by
reason of the disability or death of a parent ... and ... [to aid] such children in attaining
the educational status which they might normally have aspired to and obtained but for the
disability or death of such parent."' Id. at 255 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006)). The
Veterans Court found that the purpose of the statute further supported its interpretation of the
text and said: "We believe that our interpretation of the applicable statutory language is most
consistent with the intent of Congress in enacting it." Id. at 259. Finally, the Veterans Court
suggested that even if the question were "a close one," it would apply a policy-based canon
to resolve the conflict; namely that any interpretational tie would be resolved in the Veteran's
favor. Id. (referring to the presumption that interpretive doubt should be resolved in favor of
the veteran pursuant to Brown v. Gardner,523 U.S. 115 (1994)).
"7 23 Vet. App. 143 (2009), aff'd, 618 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
273

27

276
27
278

Id. at 150.
Id.

Id. at 151.
Id. at 144 (quoting 38 U.S.C.

§ 5313(a)(1) (1993)).
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prisons under State contract.""2 However, rather than turning
immediately to the VA's interpretation, the Veterans Court turned
to other sources of meaning first.280 The Veterans Court reviewed
the statute's title and structure, which "support[ed] the conclusion
that Congress intended the compensation reduction provision to
apply to all veterans . .. regardless of whether the facility in which

they were incarcerated was publicly or privately operated." 28 ' In
addition, the Veterans Court exhaustively examined the legislative
history of the statute: "The legislative history of section 5313
provides significant insight into the congressional intent underlying
the section 5313 provision regarding benefits reduction for
veterans incarcerated for a felony."282 Moreover, the Veterans
Court found the Veteran's 83 interpretation was unpersuasive,
in part, because the Veteran had "provide[d] no support in the
legislative history" for his argument that Congress intended
to exclude State-contracted private prisons from the statute's
coverage. 84 Finally, the Veterans Court rejected the Veteran's
second argument regarding an amendment to the statute.s In
the amendment, Congress had specifically added "other penal
institution or correctional facility" to the list of relevant prisons.8
The Veteran had argued that the subsequent amendment to the
statute showed that Congress believed that the statute as originally
written did not apply to privately run prisons. The Veterans
Court rejected the Veteran's argument, finding it contrary to the
legislative history: "[T]he legislative history of the [amendment]
29 Id. at 147.

Id
Id. at 148.
282 Id.
283 In January 2009, Secretary Shinseki issued a directive indicating that in all written
documents issued by VA the "v" in "veteran" should be capitalized to read "Veteran"
when used as a proper noun. See E-mail from Ken Greenberg, Exec. Sec'y to the Dep't,
U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, to VA Cent. Office Exec. Secretariat (Jan. 23, 2009, 9:20
AM EST) (on file with the Veterans Law Review).
284 Id. at 149.
280
281

285

Id.

286

Id. at 146 n.3.
Id.

287
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states that it was promulgated as part of 'technical and clarifying
amendments to title 38. "'88 This legislative-amendment history
"further demonstrate[d] ... that the prior version of the statute

adequately expressed the congressionalintent to provide for a
reduction of benefits to veterans incarcerated for commission of a
felony, regardless of whether the institution in which a veteran is
confined is a State institution or a State-contracted institution. "289
Only after concluding that the ambiguous language included
state contracted facilities, did the Veterans Court turn to the VA's
interpretation.2 o
In doing so, the Veterans Court simply noted that Skidmore
deference was appropriate. 2 9 1 However, in justifying its deference
choice, the Veterans Court said little more than it had in Osman.
The Veterans Court merely indicated that it "reviews VA's statutory
interpretation de novo" and that the "VA's interpretation of the
statute is entitled to respect to the extent that has 'the power
to persuade."' 29 2 It cited Osman and Skidmore for proof of its
choice. 2 93 As it had in Osman, the Veterans Court never examined
whether Chevron deference might be appropriate under either
Christensen's"force of law" test or under Barnhart'sfactors
analysis. Given that the VA issued the interpretation in the same
way that it issued the interpretation in Osman, the analysis of this
issue would likely end with the same result: namely, that Skidmore
deference was appropriate. 294 Had the Veterans Court in Osman
performed a full analysis, then perhaps in this later case it would
have been justified in citing Osman for the proposition and moving
on. However, up to this point, the Veterans Court had not fully
considered whether Chevron or Skidmore was the appropriate
deference standard for VA precedential opinions.
288

289
290
291
292
293
294

Id. at 149 (quoting 152 Cong. Rec. H9015 (statement of Rep. Steve Buyer)).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 150.
Id.
Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
Id
See supra notes 241 -71 and accompanying text.

117

Veterans Law Review [Vol. 3: 20111]

Moreover, the Veterans Court did not apply Skidmore's
"power-to-persuade" test completely or accurately. The three
factors are (1) the consistency of the agency's interpretation;
(2) the thoroughness of the agency's consideration; and (3) the
soundness of the agency's reasoning. 9 As to the first factor,
the Veterans Court rejected the Veteran's argument that the VA
had been inconsistent.9 As to the second and third factors, it
concluded that the VA's interpretation was "persuasive" because
it was consistent with the Veterans Court's own, independent
interpretation of the statute.297 The Veterans Court then deferred
to the VA's interpretation.9 However, in doing so, the Veterans
Court reasoned that "the Secretary's interpretation [was] not
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law."29 9 These are not Skidmore's
"power-to-persuade" factors. 30 0 Rather, the arbitrary and capricious
standard is a completely different standard than Skidmore.30 The
arbitrary and capricious standard generally applies when courts
review agency findings of fact or policy, not agency findings of

law.30 2
Perhaps most importantly, in both Osman and Wanless,
the Veterans Court erroneously equated persuasiveness with
conformity. In other words, the Veterans Court found the VA's
interpretation persuasive only when that interpretation agreed with
the Veterans Court's own interpretation of the ambiguous language.
Yet Skidmore requires a court to review an agency's process of
interpretation along with the actual interpretation to determine
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
.96Wanless, 23 Vet. App. at 150 (rejecting the Veteran's argument that the VA's
interpretation regarding foreign prisons was relevant to the VA's interpretation regarding
state contracted prisons).
'9

297
298

Id. at 151.
Id

Id.
'on Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
301 Id
302 E.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983).
299

118

CHEVRON'S STEP ZERO

whether the agency's interpretation is persuasive, regardless of
whether the court would make the same interpretation. 3 In these
cases, the Veteran's Court usurped the agency's interpretive role.
Again in Sharp v. Shinseki,304 the Veterans Court
confused Chevron's Step Zero analysis. The facts of the case are
complicated: In 1995, a VA regional office had granted a Veteran's
service connection claim.os In the letter granting the claim, the VA
told the Veteran that he had one year to file additional information
if he wanted additional compensation benefits for his dependents
and wanted those benefits to be retroactive to the date of the award;
he failed to timely forward the information.0 6 When he did send
in the additional information, the VA awarded the benefits, but
because he forwarded the information after the one-year deadline,
the award was effective only back to the date of the late filing
(January 1997), not to the date of the original award (August
1995).30' The Veteran did not appeal the additional compensation
award.30 This is the first award (the January 1997 award). 0 9
In 1998, the VA regional office determined that the Veteran
was unemployable due to service-related injuries and awarded him
benefits effective from the date of his injury, December 1988.310
The Veteran challenged this award because it did not include
additional compensation for his dependents retroactive to 1988.311
This is the second award (the 1998 award). When the regional
office denied the challenge, the Veteran sought Board review;
however, he died while the appeal was pending."
323 U.S. at 140.
Vet. App. 267 (2009).

303 Skidmore,

30o23

Id. at 269.
Id.
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id.
3" Id.
312 Id
313 Id.
305
306
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After the Veteran died, the Veteran's wife filed for the
additional compensation based on the second award.31' The
regional office denied the request, reasoning that the first award
was final and that the law did not allow for an earlier effective
date once entitlement to additional compensation had been
established.1 5 The Board affirmed; the wife appealed to the
Veterans Court.3 t 6 The issue before the Veterans Court was
whether the statute required that additional compensation benefits
be awarded to dependents based on the first qualifying rating
(in this case the first award) or whether it could be based on any
qualifying rating (in this case the second award)." To resolve
this issue, the Veterans Court had to interpret two related statutes:
38 U.S.C. § 1115, which allowed for additional compensation
for dependents and 38 U.S.C. § 5110(f), which established the
effective date for such awards. 1
Although the VA had promulgated two regulations that
related to the issue, the Veterans Court failed to mention either
initially, stating that "[t]he [Veterans] Court reviews statutory
and regulatory interpretation de novo."3 19 The Veterans Court
then described its process for interpreting statutory language,
quoting Chevron in the process .320 As it had in the other cases

identified above, the Veterans Court simply selected a deference
standard without explanation.' In this case, the VA had issued
its interpretation via two regulations promulgated after notice

314

Id.

315

Id. at 270.

316

Id.

3"

Id. at 27 1.

318
319

Id.
Id.

Id.
The Veterans Court could have been clearer that it was choosing Chevron for evaluating
the agency's regulation. Rather, it appears to have independently evaluated the language
of the statute without noting the regulation. However, later in the opinion, it noted that
it was turning to step two of Chevron to discuss "whether the Secretary has promulgated
regulations that provide a reasonable interpretation of the statutes." Id. at 274 (citing
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
320
31
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and comment procedures;" hence, Chevron would have been
the correct standard under Christensen's"force of law" test if no
other factors were involved. However, the Veterans Court did
not provide this analysis. Moreover, as we will see in a moment,
Chevron was not the correct standard, as the Veterans Court later
concluded; thus, it should not have started with Chevron's first
step. Chevron was simply irrelevant to the analysis.
In any event, pursuant to Chevron's first step, the
Veterans Court ignored both regulations and examined the text
of 38 U.S.C. § 111533 first and found that the statute "clearly and
succinctly address[ed] when a veteran [was] entitled to additional
compensation for dependents."3 4 Indeed, contrary to the VA's
argument, the Veterans Court held that a veteran could recover
additional compensation pursuant to this statute when the veteran
met the statutory criteria; no separate claim need be filed.32 5 Yet,
a finding of implicit entitlement was not enough to resolve the
issue before the Veterans Court.3 26 The primary issue, the effective
date of the additional compensation award, was still unresolved.2
Hence, the Veterans Court next turned to the effective date of
awards statute, section 5110(f),32 8 to determine whether that statute
conclusively resolved the issue. 329 The Veterans Court concluded
The regulations in question, 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.4(b)(2) & 3.401(b) (2009), were initially
promulgated following notice and comment rulemaking; amendments of the regulations
have also followed that procedure. See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 34,886 (May 23, 1980)
(announcing amendments to several sections, including 38 C.F.R § 3.401); 44 Fed. Reg. 22,717
(Apr. 17, 1979) (announcing amendments to several sections, including 38 C.F.R. § 3.4).
"' "Any veteran entitled to compensation at the rates provided in section 1114 of this
title, and whose disability is rated not less than 30 percent, shall be entitled to additional
compensation for dependents ..... 38 U.S.C. § 1115 (2006).
* Sharp, 23 Vet. App. at 271.
32

32
36

Id. at 272.
Id. at 273.

Id.
An award of additional compensation on account of dependents based on the
establishment of a disability rating in the percentage evaluation specified by law for
the purpose shall be payable from the effective date of such rating; but only if proof of
dependents is received within one year from the date of notification of such rating action.
38 U.S.C. § 5110(f) (2006).

327
328

3'

Sharp, 23 Vet. App. at 272-74.
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that "neither statute [§ 1115 nor § 5110(f)] on its face nor
legislative history provides any guidance in answering the precise
question at issue."3 3 o
Having exhaustively and unsuccessfully reviewed the text
and legislative history of both statutes, 33 ' the Veterans Court turned
to Chevron's second step, determining whether the interpretations
in the regulations were reasonable.3 32 At this stage, after applying
Chevron's first step, the Veterans Court promptly discarded
Chevron as the appropriate deference standard.3 Why? Because
in Gonzales, the Supreme Court had held that when regulations
merely parrot statutory language, Chevron is inappropriate.3 34 In
Sharp, the Veterans Court found that the implementing regulations
did exactly that; they parroted the underlying statutory language. 3 s
330

Id. at 274.
The Veterans Court noted that 38 U.S.C. § 1115 was silent regarding how the effective date
for such additional compensation should be determined. Id. at 272. In the face of this silence,
it turned to the legislative history of the statute. According to the Veterans Court, the legislative
history suggested that the purpose of the statute was to "'defray the costs of supporting the
veteran's ... dependents' when a service-connected disability is of a certain level hindering
the veteran's employment abilities." Id. at 272 (omission in original) (quoting S. REP. No.
95-1054, as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3465). While this purpose might favor a broad
interpretation of section 1115 generally, the legislative history did not specifically identify the
effective date that should apply to additional compensation claims under section 1115:
The limited legislative history enlightens the [Veterans] Court as to the purpose of
providing additional compensation for dependents, but such history does not assist the
[Veterans] Court in determining whether Congress intended additional compensation
for dependents under section 1115 to be on (1) only the first rating decision meeting
statutory criteria of section 1115 or (2) any rating decision meeting the statutory criteria.
Id.
Finding the legislative history unenlightening, the Veterans Court returned to the text and
concluded that entitlement to section 1115 benefits should accrue whenever the statutory
factors were met. Id. In other words, although the statute did not explicitly so provide,
the Veterans Court concluded that whenever a veteran met section 1115's criteria, the
veteran's dependents were impliedly entitled to additional compensation. Id.
332 Id. at 274.
1
Id. at 275.
1
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (pointing out that the "existence of a
parroting regulation does not change the fact that the question here is not the meaning of
the regulation but the meaning of the statute").
"I First, the Veterans Court quickly found the regulation that interpreted the additional
compensation statute (section 1115) unreasonable because the regulation "merely
13
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Thus, the Veterans Court correctly determined that Skidmore,
rather than Chevron, applied; and it clearly articulated its choice. 3
Yet, assuming that Skidmore was the appropriate standard, the
Veterans Court never should have turned to Chevron.
After determining that Skidmore was appropriate, however,
the Veterans Court did not actually apply Skidmore's "power-topersuade" factors; instead, it said simply that the position was
unpersuasive because "the Secretary ha[d] offered no support for
his interpretation."3 To resolve the issue, the Veterans Court
turned to the Gardnerpresumption that "'interpretative doubt is
to be resolved in the veteran's favor."' 1 3 In doing so, it rejected
the VA's interpretation and substituted its own based on a faulty
presumption.

parrot[ed] the statutory language [of section 1115]." Sharp, 23 Vet. App. at 274. The
regulation provided: "An additional amount of compensation may be payable for a
spouse, child, and/or dependent parent where a veteran is entitled to compensation based
on disability evaluated as 30 per centum or more disabling." 38 C.F.R. § 3.4(b)(2)
(2009). Second, the Veterans Court found the second regulation, which interpreted the
effective date of awards statute (section 5 110(f)), similarly unenlightening because it also
mostly parroted the regulation. Sharp, 23 Vet. App. at 275. This regulation provided:
Awards of pension or compensation payable to or for a veteran will be effective as
follows:
(b) Dependent, additionalcompensation orpensionfor. Latest of the following
dates: ....

(3) Effective date of the qualifying disability rating provided evidence of
dependency is received within 1 year of notification of such rating action.
38 C.F.R. § 3.401. In court, the VA had argued that the word "the" before the term
"qualifying disability rating" implied that there could be only one such rating; had the
VA anticipated more than one award, the VA would have used the article "a" instead.
Sharp, 23 Vet. App. at 274-75. The Veterans Court rejected this argument, finding it
unpersuasive. Id. at 275.
336 Sharp, 23 Vet. App. at 275 ("Deference to the regulation that offers no additional
clarity to the interpretive issue would be inappropriate. Under such circumstances,
the Secretary's interpretation of the statute is not subject to Chevron deference but his
interpretation is entitled to respect to the extent it has the 'power to persuade."' (citations
omitted) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,140 (1944)).
337 Id.
338 Id. (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)).
3
See supra Part IV.B.
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In an unusual opinion, the Veterans Court applied Skidmore
analysis when it should have applied Auer deference. When an
agency interprets its own regulations, Chevron Step Zero analysis
is inapplicable. 3 4 0 Rather, an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations is controlling unless plainly wrong. 34 1 Deference under
this standard is close to automatic.
Yet, the Veterans Court often does not defer under Auer.34 2
Illustratively, in Haas v. Nicholson, the issue for the Veterans
Court was whether a Veteran who served on a ship that traveled
near the coastal waters of Vietnam but who never went ashore
"'serv[ed] in the Republic of Vietnam.' 3 4 4 A statute presumed
that a veteran who "'serv[ed] in the Republic of Vietnam"' during
a specified time period was exposed to Agent Orange.34 5 The
Secretary had promulgated a regulation interpreting this statutory
phrase to apply only to those service members whose service
involved "'duty or visitation' in Vietnam.3 46 The Secretary then
interpreted the phrase "duty or visitation" in the regulation to apply
only to veterans who had physically set foot in Vietnam, even if
only for a short time.34 7 Because the Veteran had served on a ship
that was located near Vietnam but never set foot in the country,
the Board affirmed the regional office's denial of benefits.348 The
Veteran appealed, and the Veterans Court reversed.349 In doing
so, the Veterans Court rejected the VA's interpretation of its
34

See supra Part III.A.

341 Auer

v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
See, e.g., Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 63, 78 (2005) (applying Gardneranalysis
rather than Auer to reject the Board's interpretation of its regulation); Otero-Castro v.
Principi, 16 Vet. App. 477, 484 (1999) (applying Chevron analysis rather than Auer to
reject the Board's interpretation of its regulation); Meakin v. West, 11 Vet. App. 183, 186
(1998) (failing both to cite Auer and to defer to an implementing regulation regarding the
Board's jurisdiction).
343 20 Vet. App. 257 (2006), rev'd sub nom. Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
31 Id. at 259 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1116(f) (2006)).
31 Id. at 263 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1116(f)).
3 Id. at 269 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) (2009)).
3
Id. at 267.
34 Id. at 259.
4 Id
342
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own regulation-that "duty or visitation" meant a veteran must
have actually stepped onto the land-because the regulation
was "inconsistent with prior, consistently held agency views,
[was] plainly erroneous in light of its interpretation of legislative
history, and [was] unreasonable as an interpretation of VA's own
regulations." 3s0 The Veterans Court specifically cited Skidmore,
along with Seminole Rock, to support its decision. 5 ' Yet, the
Skidmore factors are not a part of the Auer/Seminole Rock
deference standard.35 ' Rather, Auer requires that the interpretation
be rejected only if it is plainly wrong. 5 It is hard to see how the
VA's interpretation in this case could be considered plainly wrong.
The term "duty or visitation" is at least ambiguous regarding
whether a veteran had to step onto Vietnam soil. Because the VA's
interpretation in its regulation was not plainly wrong, the Veterans
Court should have upheld the regulation. Instead, it appears that
the Veterans Court simply disagreed with the interpretation, and so
substituted its own. Indeed, the case was reversed on appeal for

this reason.3 54
In conclusion, while the Veterans Court may be aware of
Chevron's Step Zero, its jurisprudence could be clearer on when
and why Chevron, Skidmore, or even Auer deference is appropriate.
Moreover, the Veterans Court occasionally reverts to Skidmore
analysis when Skidmore has no application. 5 5 Additionally, when
it applies its deference standard, the Veterans Court often does not
apply the selected standard accurately. Perhaps most importantly,
the Veterans Court is less deferential than the three standards
would suggest it should be. The VA's interpretation should control
more often than not; instead, the Veterans Court substitutes its own
interpretation of ambiguous statutory language regularly.
Id. at 270.
Id. (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945); Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
350
35

35
3
3
3ss

See supra Part III.A.

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
See supra notes 303-40 and accompanying text.
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B. The Veterans Court & Gardner's Presumption
Within veterans' law, there is an odd presumption that
exists regarding interpretive doubt. This odd presumption, which I
will call "Gardner'spresumption," conflicts directly with Chevron.
Gardner'spresumption-that interpretive doubt is to
be resolved in favor of the veteran-was first articulated in two
cases that predated Chevron: Boone v. Lightner5 6 and Fishgoldv.
357
Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corporation.
The presumption was
358 The
cited again, after Chevron, in King v. St. Vincent's Hospital.
issue for the Supreme Court in King was whether a provision in
the Veterans Reemployment Rights Act provided a member of the
reserve services with an unlimited right to civilian reemployment. 35 9
No agency had interpreted the statute; rather, the employer sought
a declaratory judgment that the statute should be read to include a
reasonable limit on the length of time that the reservist's position
had to remain open.36 o Rejecting the employer's interpretation, the
Supreme Court found the text of the statute clear.36 In a footnote,
the Court suggested, in dictum, that even if the employer had had
a reasonable argument that the statute was ambiguous, the Court
would have resolved the ambiguity in favor of the reservist: "[the
Court] would ultimately read the provision in [the reservist's] favor
under the canon that provisions for benefits to members of the
Armed Services are to be construed in the beneficiaries' favor."36 1
The Court further noted that Congress was likely aware of this
interpretive principle and had drafted accordingly.3 6
319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943) (holding that a veteran was not entitled to a continuance
under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act).
3'
328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946) (holding that a veteran who returned to his former position
as a welder could be laid off during slow work periods pursuant to Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940).
3ss 502 U.S. 215 (1991).
3s9 Id. at 216.
3
Id. at 219.
361 Id. at 222.
361 Id. at 220-21
n.9.
363 Id.
356
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Just three years later, the Supreme Court referred to its
King dictum in Brown v Gardner,16an opinion involving the VA's
interpretation of a statute. 6 s In Gardner,the Supreme Court held
that a VA regulation that required a veteran to prove that a disability
resulted from the VA's negligent treatment or from an accident
occurring during VA treatment was inconsistent with the plain
language of the controlling statute.6 Finding the language of the
statute clear under Chevron's first step, the Court rejected the VA's
regulation as inconsistent with this clear text. 67 Indeed, the Court
went further and stated that even if the Government could show
ambiguity-which the Government could not-any "interpretive
doubt [was] to be resolved in the veteran's favor." 6 In creating
Gardner'spresumption, the Court cited the footnote dictum from
King. 6 But the Court in Gardnernever reached Chevron's second
step because there was no ambiguity to resolve.370
Gardner'spresumption has become somewhat of a legend
in veterans' jurisprudence. It is raised often by veteran litigants37'
and cited regularly by the Veterans Court,37 by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit),7

513 U.S. 115 (1994).
Id. at 116.
366 Id. at 118-20.
367 Id. at 120.
3
Id. at 118.
369 Id.
370 Id. at 120.
37
E.g., Haas v. Peake, 544 F.3d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (raising the issue for the
first time in a petition for rehearing); Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 63, 69 (2005),
rev'd, 451 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
371 See, e.g., Nielson v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 56, 59 (2009); Osman v. Peake, 22 Vet.
App. 252, 259 (2008) (indicating that even if the issue were a "close one," the court
was required to resolve any interpretive doubt "in the veteran's favor" (citing Brown v.
Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994))); Otero-Castro v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 375, 380
(2002) (applying Gardnerpresumption to resolve ambiguity in favor of Veteran).
3
See, e.g., Sursely v. Peake, 551 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating "in the face
of statutory ambiguity, we must apply the rule that 'interpretive doubt is to be resolved
in the veteran's favor') (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)); Terry v.
Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
3-

365
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and even occasionally by the Supreme Court. 7 Yet, King did
not involve an agency interpretation, nor did it raise Chevron
issues.37 s Whether the presumption should apply in the face of a
contradictory interpretation by the VA was not directly addressed
in either Brown or King. Importantly, Gardner'spresumption
collides head on with the Supreme Court's Chevron approach, in
which agencies are awarded the power to interpret statutes because
of their expertise, because of Congress's implied delegation to
them, and because agencies are more politically accountable
than courts. 7 In other words, Congress gives power to fill
the interstices of the law to the VA, not to veterans. 7 When
the VA does not interpret a statute, it makes sense for a court
to use Gardner'spresumption to resolve any ambiguity. The
purpose of the veterans' statutes in general is to help veterans;378
hence, the presumption simply makes sense from a statutory
interpretation approach. And, even when the VA has interpreted
a statute, but did so without "force of law" procedures, then
Gardner'spresumption may be relevant as one more factor to
add to Skidmore's "power-to-persuade" test.3 79 But when the VA
interprets a statute with more deliberative procedures, it is less
clear that Gardner'spresumption should apply. For if Gardner's
presumption applies, then Chevron's second step would no
longer be about the reasonableness of the VA's interpretation;
rather, Chevron's second step would become a question of which
interpretation was more favorable to the veteran. The power to fill
interstices in the law would be in veterans' hands.
3 See, e.g., Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1709 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(writing that "even if there were a question in my mind, I would come out the same way
under our longstanding 'rule that interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran's
favor."' (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)).
3 King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215 (1991).
376 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 865-66 (1984).

" See supra Part II.B.

See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 525 (2006) (discussing "Federal laws relating to veterans' relief').
Indeed, in Sursely, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal
Circuit) specifically suggested that Gardner'spresumption was appropriate because
"the Secretary ha[d] not provided an interpretation of the statute eligible for Chevron
deference." Sursely v. Peake, 551 F.3d 1351, 1357 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
37.

3
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For precisely this reason, the Federal Circuit cautioned
that courts "must take care not to invalidate otherwise reasonable
agency regulations simply because they do not provide for a
pro-claimant outcome in every imaginable case.""se In Sears v.
Principi,the Federal Circuit soundly rejected a Veteran's argument
that "ambiguity must always be resolved in favor of the veteran
because the pro-claimant policy underlying the veterans' benefits
scheme overrides Chevron deference." 8 ' Unfortunately, the
Federal Circuit did not explain how to resolve the tension between
Gardner'spresumption and Chevron's second step. 82 In the same
38
year, in Terry v. Principi,
1 the Federal Circuit further directed that
Gardner'spresumption "is a canon of statutory construction that
requires that resolution of interpretive doubt arising from statutory
language be resolved in favor of the veteran. It does not affect the
determination of whether an agency's regulation is a permissible
construction of a statute."3 84 In other words, the Federal Circuit
seems to be suggesting that courts ignore Gardner'spresumption
when Chevron applies.
The first time that the Veterans Court directly addressed the
conflict between Gardnerand Chevron, the Veterans Court upheld
the Board's interpretation; however, the opinion was subsequently
Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1331-32 (Fed. Cir. 2003); cf DeBeaord v. Principi,
18 Vet. App. 357, 364-65 (2004) (cautioning that the "Federal Circuit has also stated in
discussing the Chevron standard and Gardner cannon [sic] of construction: 'Moreover,
where the application of customary canons of statutory construction points in opposite
directions, we resort to the Chevron principle"' (quoting Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v.
Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 345 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003)), appeal dismissed, No.
05-7003, 2005 WL 290002 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 14, 2005).

38

3

Sears, 349 F.3d at 1331.

Id. at 1332 (indicating only that the Veteran failed to identify any VA regulation that
did not operate in his favor).
3"
340 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
3
Id. at 1384 (footnote and citation omitted) ("'Ordinarily at this juncture in the
analysis-where application of the usual canons of statutory construction [i.e., canon to resolve
interpretive doubt in favor of the veteran and canon to consider legislative history] push in
opposite directions-we would resort to the Chevron principle, which mandates that we defer
to an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute."' (quoting Nat'l Org. of
Veterans' Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
3
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vacated. In Jordanv. Principi,ssthe Veterans Court concluded
that Gardner'spresumption only applied where there were two
reasonableinterpretations:
[W]e hold that, under Brown v. Gardner,we must
resolve interpretative doubt in favor of claimants
only where there are competing reasonable
interpretations of an ambiguous statutory provision
and that, consequently, that interpretive doctrine
cannot, by definition, be applied to lead to a statutory
interpretation that produces an absurd result ...
because such an interpretation would be inherently
not "reasonable.""
Subsequently, however, the Veterans Court has cited to both
Sears and Terry and exercised increasing restraint in resorting to
Gardner'spresumption.
Resolving the tension between Chevron and Gardneris
problematic, but necessary. In addition, there is another concern
with Gardner'spresumption: exactly when is an interpretation
sufficiently favorable to veterans? The Federal Circuit raised
this concern with Gardner'spresumption in Haas v. Peake. * As
noted earlier, the issue in that case was whether a Veteran who
served on a ship that traveled near Vietnam but who never went
ashore had "'serv[ed] in the Republic of Vietnam. "388 The VA
had promulgated a regulation interpreting this phrase to apply
only to those service members whose service involved "'duty or
visitation' in Vietnam.38 9 The VA then interpreted the phrase "duty
or visitation" in the regulation to apply only to veterans who had
physically set foot in Vietnam, even if only for a short time.3 90 The
16 Vet. App. 335 (2002), withdrawn, No. 00-206,2002 WL 31445159 (Vet. App. Nov 1,2002).
Id. at 348.
3 544 F.3d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
311 Id. at 1307-08 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) (2009)).
" Id. (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii)).
390 Id. at 1308-09.
3

38
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Veteran had appealed the VA's decision and, ultimately, lost before
the Federal Circuit. 9' Petitioning for rehearing, the Veteran argued
that Gardner'spresumption should have applied. 92 The Federal
Circuit disagreed. 9 Because the Veteran had neglected to raise
the issue during his original appeal, the Federal Circuit held that
the argument had been waived.9 However, in doing so, it noted
this difficulty of applying Gardner'spresumption: "[T]his case
would present a practical difficulty in determining what it means
for an interpretation to be 'pro-claimant."' 39 5 Specifically, the
Federal Circuit noted that the VA had already interpreted the statute
in a pro-veteran manner by applying the language to any veteran
who set foot on land, for however long.396 Thus, Haas raised the
question: Exactly how veteran-friendly must a rule be to survive a
Gardner attack? The answer is simply unclear.
In short, Gardner'spresumption has morphed from a
simple assumption in non-agency interpretation cases to a claim
of right in VA cases. The Veterans Court has relied on Gardner's
presumption often as added support for its decision to reject the
VA's interpretation of a statute.' In dictum, the Veterans Court
recognized the quandary:
If we had been required to deal with an ambiguous
statutory scheme, however, it is not altogether clear
that we would have to abandon the directive of the
Supreme Court in Gardner,that 'interpretive doubt
is to be resolved in the veteran's favor', a directive
derived from King, a case issued seven years after
Chevron, that applied that interpretive principle to
'read [a regulation] in [the veteran's] favor', and
31

Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008), rehearingdenied, 544 F.3d at 1310.

392

Haas, 544 F.3d. at 1308.

39

Id

394

Id.

3
396
3'

Id.
Id. at 1308-09.
E.g., Sharp v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 267, 275 (2009).
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that drew that principle from Fishgoldv. Sullivan
Drydock & Repair Corp. a case decided long before
Chevron. Not only was that canon confirmed
by the Supreme Court in Gardnerten years after
Chevron, but it is one tailored specifically to veterans
benefits statutes as contrasted with the more general
statutory-construction principle set forth in Chevron.
In the last analysis, guidance from the Supreme
Court would appear necessary to resolve this matter
definitively. 98
As the Veterans Court suggests, this conflict should be
explored and resolved.
CONCLUSION
It is no wonder that lower courts are struggling to apply the
Supreme Court's guidance in this area. The Court has turned what
was once a relatively simply two-step into a complicated flamenco.
Whereas Chevron established a bright line rule that provided some
certainty, the Court's jurisprudence has returned the analysis to
a case-by-case approach. Predictability and straightforwardness
have both been lost. Chevron analysis has been transformed from
a simple deference test to a choice of deference tests. At Chevron's
Step Zero, a court must choose Chevron or Skidmore or even no
deference. Today, that choice is not an easy one.
According to the Court, that choice depends on whether
Congress intends that an agency have deference for interpretations
of statutes. 9 If so, then courts should apply Chevron, regardless
of how the agency reached the interpretation.oo In these situations,
3" DeBeaord v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 357, 368 (2004) (citations omitted) (quoting King
v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220-21 n.9 (1991) (citing Fishgold v. Sullivan
Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946))).
3
See supra Part I.B.
400 See id.
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Chevron is appropriate because Congress intended for the agencies,
not the courts, to develop this area of law. As the Court has held,
"Chevron govern[s] only those cases where the agency was acting
under a congressional delegation of lawmaking authority to the
agency" or acts with "force of law." 01 Other deference standards
govern when the agency does not act with the "force of law." 40 2
In contrast, when Congress does not so intend, then the agency
is deserving of only Skidmore deference. 403 In this situation,
Congress intended the courts to be the final arbiters of these types
of legal issues.
Unsurprisingly, the Veterans Court's approach to Chevron
and its prodigy could use some fine-tuning; the Veterans Court's
recent jurisprudence shows confusion regarding when and how
Chevron should apply and when and how Skidmore should
apply. 4 04 For example, the Veterans Court regularly states that it
reviews issues of agency interpretation of statutes de novo, even
when it subsequently applies one of the deference standards.40 5
Additionally, the Veterans Court often fails to analyze clearly, if at
all, Chevron's Step Zero-the Christensenforce-of-law test and the
Barnhartfactors analysis. 06 And even when the Veterans Court
selects a deference standard, it does not always apply the selected
standard accurately. 407 Finally, it turns often to a presumption that
is completely at odds with Chevron.40 8
Yet, despite my criticisms, I cannot fault the Veterans
Court for its confusion; the Supreme Court left a mess for the
lower courts to resolve. Recently, a number of administrative

4oEskridge & Baer, supra note 3, at 1088 (citing United States v. Mead Corp.,

533 U.S.

218, 226-27 (2001)).
402 Id. at 1098-1100.
40 Id at 1109-11.
4 See supra Part IV.
40 See supra Part IV.A.

Id.
Id.
40sWhether Gardner'spresumption should play any role in Chevron analysis should be
more fully examined than has been done to date.
406

4
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law scholars debated this issue in a listserv discussion on how
to present deference issues in the classroom. Professor Ronald
Levin noted that the "Mead issue is the toughest of the tough. It
really confuses the students because the Mead Court's distinctions
are obscure and the difference between Chevron and Skidmore is
also obscure." 409 And Professor Peter Strauss noted simply, but
eloquently, that "the courts are confused." 4 10
Justice Scalia direly predicted that "We will be sorting out
the consequences of the Mead doctrine . . . for years to come."4 1 1

Illustratively, the Veterans Court's jurisprudence proves that he
was right.

409Posting of Ronald Levin, Levin@wulaw.wustl.edu, to owner-adminlaw@chicagokent.
kentlaw.edu (June 9, 2010) (on file with author).
411 Posting of Peter Strauss, strauss@law.columbia.edu, to owner-adminlaw@
chicagokent.kentlaw.edu (June 9, 2010) (on file with author). In a separate e-mail to
me, he later added, "I don't understand how confused they are, and find the basic Mead
proposition a simple one, and a correct one." E-mail from Peter Strauss, Betts Professor
of Law, Columbia Law School, to Linda Jellum, Associate Professor of Law, Mercer
University Law School (June 28, 2010 12:11 EST) (on file with author).
411 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
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